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ABSTRACT 
 
 
HUIPING LI. The economic impact of spatial income inequality 
 (Under the direction of DR. HARRISON CAMPBELL) 
 
 
     Spatial income inequality refers to the unequal distribution of income across communities. 
This study broadens the concept to include residential segregation, central city-suburban income 
disparity, and government fragmentation. Combining the complementary effect perspective and 
spatial mismatch hypothesis, this project hypothesizes that residential segregation negatively 
impacts metropolitan economic growth. Arguments from agglomeration effect suggest the natural 
tie between central cities and suburbs, and support the negative impact of distressed central cities 
on metropolitan economic growth. Although there is a hot debate between public choice theories 
and urban regionalism about metropolitan governance, this project follows the arguments of 
regionalists and hypothesizes that metropolitan areas with higher government fragmentation are 
associated with slower economic growth. Based on data from U.S. Census, U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and other resources, this project conducted three OLS estimations on 
economic growth in ten years based on data in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000 to test the hypotheses. 
Dependent variables are annual average growth rates of real personal income per capita in 1980-
1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2005. Then an OLS estimation was conducted on the long-term 
economic growth from 1980 to 2005. Results show that racial segregation has a negative impact 
on both short term and long term economic growth. The negative impact of income segregation 
emerged from 1990s and turns robust in the model of 2000. The negative sign of percent of black 
families without a car indicates that theory about spatial mismatch in urban labor market 
suggesting the negative impact of residential segregation on economic growth is supported. The 
changing sign of income disparity between central cities and suburbs is not consistent and need to 
be cautiously interpreted. The positive impact of special districts supports regional-wide 
metropolitan governance. Although more analyses need to be done to understand the results from 
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the model of the data in 1990s, the results suggest policy implications. That is, comprehensive 
strategies need to be considered to increase the quality of life of the poor and economic growth 
through breaking the barriers among different communities. A comprehensive program plan, 
including social policy, financial policy, housing and land-use policy targeted to resolve the 
fundamental urban problem might be more effective than the current isolated policy structure 
implemented independently by different sectors in different fields. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     Residential segregation is significant in American society. Compared with its European peers, 
the degree of residential stratification in the United States is remarkably high. The census 
estimates missing data according to one’s residence and the nearby areas (U.S. Census 2000).  
Since companies often use residential locations to estimate existing or potential markets, zip 
codes have become a yardstick measuring one’s lifestyle (Weiss 1988). It indicates the kinds of 
magazines you read, the meals you serve at dinner, whether you are a liberal Republican or an 
apathetic Democrat. In other words, where you live determines how you live (Weiss 1988). 
     Location is also an important determinant for successful decision-making in business, 
government and all the other non-profit agencies. Those decisions and behaviors in turn reinforce 
stratified residential structure (Goss 1995).Retailers use zip codes to decide everything from 
where to locate a designer boutique to what kind of actor to use in their TV commercials. College 
and military recruiters rely on zip codes to target promising high-school graduates (Weiss 1988). 
Based on the clustered residence, contemporary marketing research developed geodemographics 
to enable marketers to predict behavioral responses of consumers according to statistical models 
of identity and residential location (Baker and Baker 1992, Goss 1995). The system has been 
applied in marketing as well as nonprofit agencies, including local governments and electoral 
campaign (Grande 1992, Bryan 1993).  
     All this means that neighborhood and community context have important effects on life 
chances in addition to individual characteristics and family background in the United States. 
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One’s access to decent jobs, health care, and good quality food, and one’s exposure to shapes 
one’s ability to earn income (Swanstrom et al. 2002). “The sorting of economic classes across 
space in American metropolitan areas both promotes rising economic inequality, and amplifies its 
effects in ways that do not show up in the income statistics” (Swanstrom et al. 2002 P350).  
     Moreover, different economic strata do not just live in different neighborhoods, but in separate 
local political jurisdictions, particularly municipalities and school districts. Because these local 
jurisdictions fund and provide many important public services in the United States, residential 
segregation widens disparities both in the cost to taxpayers and the quality of public services. In 
addition, competition among local governments for tax base distorts metropolitan development, 
leading to geographical mismatches between where people live and where they work that further 
exacerbate economic inequalities. 
1.1 Research Question 
 
 
     An extensive literature has documented that various institutions, pro-suburbanization federal 
policies and exclusive local policies have contributed to, and reinforced, residential stratification 
in the United State (Briggs 2005, Coutes et al. 1977, Dreier et al. 2002, Rusk 1993, Voith 2000). 
Many studies suggest that the market is the primary force driving the process. Americans prefer 
living in neighborhoods occupied primarily by households with incomes equal to or higher than 
their own, with similar cultural values, outlooks, and similar racial or ethnic backgrounds (Berry 
1975, Downs 1994, Evans 1973). Desirability is translated into home prices, property values and 
capital values (Thorns 1981). Households need to pay enough to live in their desired 
communities.  
     To cater to the preferences of middle-income and upper-income households, builders create 
large subdivisions of homes similar in size and price which results in internally homogeneous 
neighborhoods (Downs 1994). Thus, demand-side motivations and supply-side forces translate 
income inequality into a residential hierarchy across urban areas in the United States: High-
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income households cluster in high-prestige areas, middle-income in middling-prestige areas and 
so forth. At the top are a few high-prestige communities with expensive homes; at the bottom are 
a large number of low-prestige communities of often deteriorated housing in the central cities and 
inner suburbs (Downs 1994). Urban landscape is thus symbolized as residential segmentation, the 
evident division between distressed central cities and prosperous suburbs, and the fragmented 
political jurisdictions. Because race has played a striking role in the residential stratification 
process, racial segregation is also included in this study.  Hence, this study defines spatial income 
inequality as the stratified and segregated communities scattered across urban areas, the distinct 
separation between cities and suburbs, and the fragmented government structure.  
     Factors stratifying residential space are an important topic for research. However, this 
dissertation is interested in the economic consequences of spatial income inequality. Does spatial 
income inequality affect metropolitan economic growth? If so, what is the magnitude of its 
effect? What are the mechanisms that link spatial income inequality to metropolitan growth? 
What, if any, policy actions should be warranted? This project formulizes theoretical rationale 
about why and how residential segregation affects economic growth on the metropolitan scale, 
and examines the exact impact of segmented residential and political structure on metropolitan 
economic growth.  
     Integrating the complementary effects perspective from the economic growth literature, the 
spatial mismatch hypothesis from sociology and argument for the importance of central cities 
from social and economic geography, this study hypothesizes that spatial income inequality has a 
negative effect on metropolitan economic growth. To test this hypothesis, three cross-sectional 
analyses are conducted based on data from 1980, 1990 and 2000. Then another OLS estimation is 
conducted to examine the long-term economic effect. This research contributes these three 
literatures by linking them together. The following sections elaborate it in detail. Results of these 
analyses have significant policy implications as well because growing social and economic 
segregation may have enormous effect on the nation’s efforts to address its urban problems. 
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1.2 Theoretical Significance 
 
 
     The impact of income inequality on economic growth has been of keen interest to economists. 
Extensive research efforts have developed three arguments articulating the underlying 
mechanisms (Barro 1999, Kenworthy 2004). They are savings rate arguments, market 
imperfection arguments and political economy arguments1. Each of them can support either 
negative or positive influences of income inequality on economic growth.  
     Empirical studies across countries confirm a negative effect of income inequality on economic 
growth (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1990, Clarke 1995, Mo 2000, Persson and Tabellini 
1994). However, Bhatta (2001) came to the opposite conclusion in a cross-MSA study. Therefore, 
it is uncertain that results of international studies can be applied directly to a cross-MSA (or 
cross-state) analysis within a country. Moreover, although factors stratifying urban arrears are 
under study, there is an agreement that urban stratification is the consequence when 
individuals/households with different income share the space. Since segregated residential 
structure results in unequal access to resources and public services, it actually aggravates and 
reinforces income inequality. Yet most studies measure income inequality by GINI coefficients or 
percentile indices and they don’t account for the spatial component of inequality2 (Bhatta 2001, 
Chakravorty 1996 2006, Garofalo and Fogarty 1979). In this sense, conventional research about 
the connection between income inequality and economic growth does not provide a complete 
story. 
     Geographers have been the main investigators of the spatial feature of income inequality. They 
document that central-city and suburban economics are complementary. Arguments for the 
importance of cities include image effects of central cities, the importance of city amenities and 
sense of place in attracting investments and human capital, and the fiscal burdens a distressed city 
                                                 
1 Detailed elaborations of the arguments are in section income inequality. 
2 Benabou (1993) presented that residential segregation has a negative impact of macroeconomic growth. 
However, this article used the disparity between central cities and suburbs as the measurement for 
segregation. In addition, it is a theoretical prediction instead of an empirical study. 
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brings to a broad metropolitan area (Downs 1994, Ihlanfeldt 1995). Agglomeration-effect 
arguments including labor market economies, scale economies in the production of intermediate 
inputs and communication economies provide theoretical mechanisms explaining the importance 
of central cities to suburbs (Downs 1994, O’Sullivan 1993). Studies in this group are sometimes 
criticized for conflating central city and suburban ring for the categories of metro poor and 
nonpoor respectively (Gottlieb 1998). 
     Although research in this group is extensive, this question has not been fully addressed. 
Spatial income inequality contains not only a central city and suburban component, but also 
includes residential stratification on the neighborhood level. Taking spatial income inequality 
simply as the division of central city and suburbs will lead to incomplete studies in this field. 
Sociologists filled in this gap by developing an extensive literature about the causes and 
consequences of concentrated poverty following the lively debate of Wilson (1987). They 
attained fruitful results about how residential segregation has been formed and how living in a 
high poverty neighborhood affects the life of the poor and the disadvantaged (Massey and Denton 
1998). 
     However, these studies focus on the effect of residential location on the poor and minorities, 
which is mainly an equity issue, and they do not examine the effect of residential location on the 
non-poor and whites. For example, the spatial mismatch hypothesis proposed by 
sociologists/social geographers in this line suggests that residential location of the poor inhibits 
their access to employment. It illustrates that racial discrimination, physical distance, 
suburbanization and de-industrialization contribute the disadvantages of poor minorities in the 
labor market (Kain 1968, Kasarda 1990, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998, Presson and Mclafferty 
1999). 
      Yet residential segregation does not just mean the poor and minorities live isolated from the 
rest of the society, but that the well-off and other income strata also live separately from other 
groups in the society (Massey 1996, Coulton et al. 1996). By examining only one extreme, 
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concentrated poverty (and black) neighborhoods, researchers in this vein have failed to appreciate 
the broader dynamic of how economic and social classes are distributed across the metropolitan 
space, and why those dynamics undermine efforts to address the needs of minorities and the poor. 
This study, by examining the impact of residential segregation on the entire population, attempts 
to explore the broader metropolitan dynamic and its effects. 
     This dissertation completes this task by conducting a cross-MSA study within the United 
States, following the analytical framework of endogenous economic growth theory. This study 
contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, it incorporates the spatial dimension of income 
inequality into conventional economic growth research. Second, this study extends the research 
subjects of sociology and social geography to the entire population, poor and non-poor, minorities 
and whites, by looking at the impact of hierarchical residential segregation on the macroeconomic 
performance of the entire area.   
1.3 Policy Significance 
 
 
     This research has significant policy implications as well. The middle class and upper- middle 
class living in homogenous suburban communities intend to sustain the homogeneity in their 
communities. They establish independent jurisdictions to pass local zoning, building code, 
subdivision, and other regulations that raise the cost of housing high enough to exclude low-
income people, and to avoid certain externalities regulated by broader governments to affect them 
(Downs 1994). Residents in the same jurisdictions usually have similar policy preferences for the 
small and homogeneous localities (Downs 1994). Hence, hierarchical residential structure may 
have been induced by market forces, but were reinforced by fragmented institutional settings and 
exclusive land-use and housing policies. If results from this project show a negative impact of 
segregated residential structure, and if results are supportive of the theories proposed by this 
thesis linking segregated urban structure and economic growth, comprehensive strategies need to 
be shaped to cultivate a mixed living structure to break the racial and class barriers and to 
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facilitate urban macroeconomic growth. Since the 1990s, the federal government has issued 
ambitious housing policies to improve the living conditions of the poor and enhance their life 
chances. Major policies include HOPE VI, Moving to Work (MTW), and the Moving to 
Opportunities (MTO) experiment. If the theory in this project is supported by the results, it 
indicates that these policies are working on the mechanism through which segregation impacts 
urban growth. They can not resolve the urban problem fundamentally.  Social and financial 
policies against discrimination, urban planning strategies pro-mixed race and mixed income 
communities, programs supporting the poor to stay and share the resources in lower poverty 
communities are needed together to increase economic growth through changing the urban 
landscape. To do so, regional governance instead of fragmented local governments should be 
more effective in policy implementation.  
     This dissertation has five chapters. Following is the literature review. The third chapter 
explains the methodology. Results are discussed in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter concludes 
this study. 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
     This chapter reviews literature about how and why income inequality, central city-suburban 
disparity and residential segregation affect metropolitan economic growth, according to which, 
produces the hypotheses of this study. Section 2.1 illustrates the relationship among spatial 
income inequality, income inequality and economic growth. Section 2.2 presents three possible 
mechanisms, through which income inequality affects economic growth. The literature is mainly 
from cross-national analyses provided by neo-classical economic growth research. Section 2.3 
introduces the social, geographical and political dimensions of spatial income inequality. 
Residential segregation reflects the social dimension, central city—suburban disparity represents 
the geographical dimension and government fragmentation indicates the political dimension. 
Section 2.4 integrates the complementary-effect perspective from endogenous economic growth 
literature, the spatial mismatch hypothesis and school segregation literature and proposes a 
negative effect of residential segregation on metropolitan economic growth. Section 2.5 
elaborates the complementary connection between central cities and suburbs from the perspective 
of agglomeration effects and spatial spillover effects. Section 2.6 discusses studies on government 
fragmentation and integration and reviews empirical findings on the relationship between state 
annexation statues and municipal annexation activities. Based on the existing research, this 
project hypothesizes the negative impact of government fragmentation and restrictive annexation 
laws on metropolitan economic growth. 
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2.1 Income Inequality, Spatial Income Inequality and Economic Growth 
 
 
     Traditionally, sociology’s interests in inequality have focused on class, race, gender and other 
forms of social stratification. Geographical territory had not been considered by sociologists as a 
base of stratification until 1980s (Soja 1989).The study of spatial inequality examines how and 
why markers of stratification, such as economic well-being, access to resources as well as other 
inequalities related to race, gender, class and other variables varies across space.  
     The concept of space developed various perspectives to explain the stratification process once 
it was incorporated into the study of inequality. It is recognized that space intertwined with other 
social factors in complex ways (McCall 2001). Class, gender, race/ethnicity difference exists in 
populations across different geographical locations. It also exhibits in the way that different social 
groups treat and experience space. For example, women’s work-to-home pattern is different from 
men’s (Domosh and Seager 2001). Second, space is seen as the channel of inequality process. It 
constrains or amplifies social inequality. For example, residential location limits the job 
opportunities for the poor minorities living in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. It amplifies 
inequality through different access to government programs and commercial retail centers 
between the poor and the rich (Swanstrom et al. 2001). Third, space is created through inequality 
process. Struggles and negotiations among different groups -- capitalists, labors, governments and 
citizens--shape the spatial distribution of social structure, environment, and economic 
development (Hooks and Smith 2004). The diverse strategies to explain the relationship between 
space and inequality reveals that defining space precisely in stratification research is inherently 
difficult and complex. Space has a taken-for-granted nature, but it is also an axis “along which we 
experience and conceptualize the world” (Massey 1994: 251).  
     Despite the complexity of the relationship of space and stratification, this project takes spatial 
inequality as a consequence of income inequality. That is, spatial inequality is created by income 
inequality. As mentioned in the introduction, spatial inequality includes residential segregation 
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and central city-suburban disparity. They are significant phenomena that shape the American 
urban landscape, and the spatial inequality has a different channel to affect macroeconomic 
performance, this study takes spatial inequality as a concept independent of income inequality, 
instead of defining it as the spatial dimension of income inequality as the literature suggested, 
although these two concepts are closely related (Chakravorty 2006). Spatial inequality is created 
by income inequality, and associated with income inequality. Income inequality is amplified by 
spatial inequality.  
     This project assesses the economic impact of spatial income inequality. Figure 1 describes the 
theoretical connections among economic growth, income inequality and spatial income 
inequality. Each concept is connected with other concepts in mutual directions. Neo-classical 
economics provides theories about the economic impact of income inequality. Stratification 
theory elaborates how economic growth generalizes and transforms income inequality. Through 
housing markets and exclusive land-use policies, income inequality creates spatial income 
inequality. On the other hand, spatial income inequality affects income inequality through the 
uneven access of resources among residents of different neighborhoods. Endogenous economic 
growth theory combined with the spatial mismatch hypothesis theorizes the economic impact of 
spatial income inequality. Government structure and urban policies reinforce the impacts too. 
Through income inequality and the housing markets, economic growth has an effect on spatial 
income inequality. This study concentrates on explaining the two thick solid arrows pointing 
economic growth from spatial income inequality.  
     The next section elaborates theories about the effects of income inequality on economic 
growth. After that, this chapter will illustrate the underlying theories that connected spatial 
income inequality and economic growth.     
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Figure 2.1 Income inequality, spatial income inequality and economic growth 
 
2.2 Income Inequality and Economic Growth 
 
 
     Socioeconomic segregation is created by income inequality, associated with income inequality 
and also exacerbates income inequality through jobs, public services and retail services 
(Swanstrom et al. 2002, Watson 2006). Income inequality at the metropolitan scale is a 
continuing subject of interest among urban scholars (Gottlieb 1998). Empirical studies on 
metropolitan income inequality supplemented with studies on residential segregation broaden the 
range of public policy at the metropolitan scale. For example, empirical results about the negative 
economic impact of income inequality would suggest traditional people-based social welfare 
programs for alleviating poverty. A robust finding about the social and economic effect of spatial 
income inequality can lead to policies such as central-city revitalization, magnet school programs 
or relaxation of exclusively zoning programs. Because of the intertwining nature of income 
inequality and socioeconomic segregation, studies on economic effects of both spatial income 
inequality and income inequality present comprehensive policy strategies for social problems.  
Income 
Inequality  Spatial Income Inequality  
Economic Growth 
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      Due to the extensive literature on the economic effects of income inequality, we start with 
income inequality as the theoretical elaboration of this project. Theories about the economic 
impact of income inequality not only assist portraying the overall framework of this study, but 
also shed light on the theoretical connection between spatial income inequality and economic 
growth. 
     Savings rate arguments, market imperfection arguments, and political economy arguments are 
three well-developed theories articulating the underlying mechanisms of the impact of income 
inequality on subsequent economic growth (Barro 1999, Kenworthy 2004). Each of them 
supports positive and negative influences of income inequality on metropolitan economic growth.  
     Savings rate arguments present a positive correlation between income inequality and economic 
growth (Barro 1999). Savings rates, i.e., savings as a percentage of income, increase with the 
level of income (Barro 1999). Those with moderate or low incomes tend to spend most of their 
income. The wealthy thus are the principle source of investment in a capitalist economy. 
Therefore, a society concentrating incomes into the hands of a few rich people is associated with 
a higher saving rate, thus higher investment rate, and consequently the growth rate. Second, 
compressed earnings distributions and the high tax rates used to fund redistributive programs 
reduce the financial gain from hard work and skill development. This is thought to act as a 
disincentive to people’s work efforts and investments in skills. Thus, a society concentrating 
incomes into hands of a few rich people is associated with a higher saving rate, which presumably 
provides capital for investment and thereby grows faster. 
     One vulnerability of the arguments is that savings do not necessarily go to investments, 
especially for the metropolitan areas where capital is a common resource for all the metropolitan 
economies. It means internal savings from a metropolitan area might go to another area, and vice 
versa a metropolitan area with a low saving rate might be able to attract external capital 
investments due to its natural resources, geographical location, labor pool, or local development 
policies. In other words, for the economies of metropolitan areas, capital investment is less 
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dependent on internal savings.   In addition, since the wealthy tend to save a higher share of their 
income than do the poor, greater inequality may yield weaker consumer demand. Low demand 
may lead to less investment, owing to a lower profit rate, less capacity utilization, and eventually 
less income growth (Kenworthy 2004).  
     Credit market imperfection arguments stress the negative impact of inequality on individuals’ 
capabilities to accumulate human and physical capital (Deininger and Squire 1997). Lower assets 
and incomes constrain people’s borrowing probabilities for their investments on human and 
physical capital. Thus, higher inequality is associated with lower human and physical capital and 
consequently with lower per capita income growth rates. This is particularly likely to be true in 
the United States. Even with substantial funds available for financial aid, many students from 
lower-income households are forced to pay a relatively large amount to attend college. According 
to Kane (2001), 66 percent of children from top income quartile attended a four-year college 
compared to 28 percent of those from families in the bottom quartile.  
     At the other hand, income concentration accumulates resources for the wealthy to invest in 
their human capital. It is argued that more investment in human capital exhibits increasing 
returns. For example, an individual with bachelor degree earns significantly higher than a person 
without college degree. Thus, income concentration is associated with large investments in 
human capital which is associated with higher returns and subsequently beneficial to economic 
growth. 
      Political economics argues the majority of voters below the mean income vote for 
redistributive policies which deter the investment incentives and consequently reduce economic 
growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994). However, this effect does not 
appear to occur in affluent nations (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Kenworthy 2004, Persson and 
Tabellini 1994). Given the vote turnout in the US is low and the lobbies for special-interest 
advocacies are pretty strong (Olson 1965, Schattsneider 1960), the political economy channels 
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may not be significantly influencing the inequality-growth relationship in the MSAs (Bhatta 
2001). 
     As the above discussion shows, inequality affects growth through various mechanisms that 
often work in opposite directions. Thus, empirical investigation is the key to understanding the 
effect of income inequality on economic growth. 
     Many empirical studies across countries confirm a negative effect of income inequality on 
economic growth (Clarke 1995, Mo 2000, Persson and Tabellini 1994). According to the results 
from the analyses based on the ‘Barro-type’ regression, Clarke (1995) found initial income 
inequality has a negative impact on growth. This result is robust across different measurements of 
income inequality, such as GINI coefficient, Theil’s index and the coefficient of variation. This 
correlation holds for both democracies and non-democracies. Mo (2000) not only assessed the 
negative impact of income inequality on growth based on the endogenous growth model, but also 
examined the channels through which inequality affects growth. He found the negative effects of 
income inequality penetrate all aspects of economy through the human capital accumulation 
channel, the income redistribution channel and the political instability channel. While the weights 
of each channel are controversial, Mo’s study suggests the income redistribution is the most 
important. This result is confirmed by Persson and Tabellini (1994). Based on endogenous 
growth and endogenous policy making theory, Persson and Tabellini developed a general-
equilibrium model and found a negative impact of income inequality on growth. Their analysis 
suggests that the negative effects of initial income inequality are from redistributive policies, 
which is consistent with the finding from Mo (2000). Data for most empirical studies on this 
question are from data sets assembled by Robert Barro and J-W Lee3 and Deimnger and Squire4 
                                                 
3 This data set is available in NBER website. 
 
4 This data set is available in World Bank website. 
 
 
 
15
5. Thus all these empirical studies found negative effects of income inequality on growth. And it 
is likely that income inequality affects growth through redistributive policies a society 
implemented for social stability as the political economics argument presents.  
     However, a cross-MSA study by Bhatta (2001) gained a positive impact of income inequality 
on metropolitan income growth. It implies it is uncertain whether the results of the international 
studies can be applied directly to the cross-MSA (or cross-state) analysis within a country.   
     While I acknowledge the uncertainty about the application of the results from cross-country 
studies to cross-MSA studies within the U.S., with the knowledge that human capital and physical 
capital are both mobile enough to be common resources under the MSA context, and with the 
reality that population and economies of MSAs have been affected by national, state and local 
redistributive policies, I expect a negative association between income inequality and economic 
growth.       
H1a: Metropolitan areas with high income inequality should be associated with slower economic 
growth rates. 
H1b: Metropolitan areas with high poverty rates should be associated with slower economic 
growth rates. 
2.3 Spatial Income Inequality 
 
 
      As a phenomenon created by and associated with income inequality, spatial income 
inequality is multi-dimensional: social, geographical and political. It is social because it is the 
socioeconomic status stratified by space. It is geographical in the sense that the distinction 
between different social-economic classes upon geographical boundaries is significantly clear on 
the American urban landscape. It is well documented that the fragmented urban government 
structure corresponds with segmented residential structure. Urban policies, either directly or 
                                                 
5 Most studies use data after 1970 because there is too much missing data for observations before 1970. 
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indirectly, have reinforced residential segregation or been fighting for integration. Thus the 
political dimension of spatial income inequality in urban studies is unavoidable.  
     Residential segregation has been the central feature of the American metropolitan areas. About 
40 years ago, Gerhard Lenski defined the study of social inequality as’ who gets what and why’ 
(Lenski 1966). Today, residential location and race are associated with this key question of social 
equity. Spatial disparity penetrates almost all urban socioeconomic dimensions, such as health, 
crime, employment, education and fiscal resources. Location determines access to virtually all the 
products and services associated with good life (Squires and Kubrin 2005). Segregation shapes 
the context in which policy decisions are made (Watson 2006). 
     Health disparities are the most concrete disadvantage associated with spatial and racial 
division in urban areas. Research documents that access to clean air and water, exposure to lead 
paint, stress, obesity, diet, social isolation, proximity to hospitals and availability of health 
insurance all vary by neighborhood and contribute to long-established disparities in heath and 
wellness (Bullard 1996, Dreier et al 2002, Klinenberg 2002).  
     Crime is a critical factor of life quality. Although most serious crime rates have gone down in 
recent years, crime remains concentrated in central cities and selected inner-ring suburbs (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2001).  
     Spatial mismatch theorists recognized that employment is far more dependent partially on 
place and race (Kain 1968, 1992, 2004). Lack of exposure to mainstream middle-class role 
models and social networks is a major contributor to urban jobless and social problems (Wilson 
1987). Neighborhood quality associates with school quality. Reliance on property tax to fund 
public schools actually nurtures on-going inequality in nation’s schools that is explicitly tied to 
place.  
     Geographically the disparity between central cities and their suburbs is remarkable in the 
metropolitan socioeconomic landscape. It is a crucial measurement of residential segregation. It is 
the macro-level expression of segregation on metropolitan areas. American urban growth has 
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long been characterized by central city decline, its loss of fiscal independence and waning of this 
political power.  This problem has not been effectively addressed by federal, state and local 
polices. The problems facing central cities have proven extremely frustrating.  In addition, with 
the federal safety net passing down to state and local government, local political and financial 
support is determinate for the effectiveness of public services and antipoverty programs.  
     In addition, segregation and the deterioration of central cities reinforce themselves through 
hindering effective political process and policies. The social and income disparity between central 
cities and their suburbs and between rich and poor communities fosters the mutual ignorance and 
has been a strong impediment to initiatives on matters with regional significance (Frisken 2001, 
Kantor 2006, Savitch and Vogel 2004). Suburban residents build their own local political 
jurisdictions and implement exclusive policies to protect their property and well-being. They 
question why they should pay for the recovery of a distress area that they believe does not touch 
them (Stegman 1997). Hence, spatial income inequality is associated with conservatism in 
politics (Dunleavy 1979, Engels 1969). Liberal policies to revitalize distressed areas or to support 
the disadvantaged inhabitants wane. As a result, for metropolitan areas with high poverty 
concentrations, it has been extremely hard to raise tax base for public services from the well-off 
suburbs. Thus it is substantially important to provide the political rationale convincing the non-
poor that the impact of segregation is in their welfare equation. 
        However, existing literature in both urban studies and sociology has focused on the 
consequences of residential segregation on the disadvantaged/the poor and the minority. Racial 
segregation and income sorting deteriorate the poor’s heath, concentrate crime in poor/minority 
communities, and limit the job and education opportunities of the residents in distressed 
neighborhoods. Little research has been done to demonstrate the impact of residential segregation 
on the entire population or the entire metropolitan area, or the impact of central city-suburban 
disparity on metropolitan growth. This project examines the impact of residential segregation on 
the metropolitan economic performance, i.e. the impact on the welfare of the entire urban 
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population: the poor and non-poor, white and minorities. It will provide empirical evidence that 
lifting the conditions and opportunities of the poor and disadvantaged is beneficial for the entire 
population. 
     With an increased importance of the metropolitan-level geography in the global economy and 
in the management of quality of life, a very diverse urban government structure has been created 
by the power balance between the regionalism of public service provision and conservative 
politics nurtured by segregation. Thus it is necessary to integrate the efficiency and equity issues 
of the government structure and policies in this empirical study. 
     Figure 2.2 shows the theoretical foundation of each dimension of spatial income inequality to 
economic growth, i.e. residential segregation, the disparity between central cities and their 
suburbs, government structure and metropolitan economic growth. Endogenous economic growth 
theory combined with spatial mismatch hypothesis proposes a negative impact of residential 
segregation on metropolitan economic growth. Agglomeration effects and spill-over effects argue 
for the importance of central city to suburban growth. Public choice theories and regionalism 
either support or oppose fragmented government structure. 
     The following section elaborates theories linked residential segregation and economic growth. 
The effect of central city and suburban income disparity is then discussed. And the political 
dimension, which means government structure and urban policies in this study, is presented last. 
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      Figure 2.2 Spatial income inequality and economic growth 
2.4 Residential Segregation and Economic Growth 
 
 
     Abundant research has established the spatial mismatch hypothesis and posited the 
deteriorating education quality in public schools from education segregation.  Combined with 
endogenous economic growth theory, this line of research provides a theoretical framework that 
connects residential segregation and metropolitan economic growth. Residential segregation 
slows down metropolitan economic growth by deterring education investment of the society, 
through the labor market mechanism and the education system. 
2.4.1 Complementary Effect Perspective 
     Endogenous growth theories argue that new ideas (or innovation, technological progress, 
knowledge growth)6 are the engine of local and national economic growth. Social interactions 
among individuals (the external effect of human capital) are one source of knowledge growth. 
The number of researchers and subsidies to R&D is one determinant factor to economic growth. 
However, recent research states that since low- skill labor is complementary to high-skill labor, 
                                                 
6 This dissertation takes these terms as interchangeable items. 
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the ratio of production workers to researchers is the determinant of economic growth instead of 
the number of researchers. 
     The idea-based endogenous growth models propose that the economic growth rate is 
proportional to the total amount of research undertaken in the economy. Thus, R&D subsidies 
will foster research intensity and therefore lead to higher economic growth. Other things equal, an 
increase in the population raises the number of researchers and hence drives the growth of per 
capita income (Aghion and Howitt 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Romer 1990b).  
     The predictions are criticized for the inconsistency between their predictions and the empirical 
evidence in the 20th-century (Jones 1995). From 1960 to 2007, expenditure on R&D increased 
dramatically. For example, U.S. R & D expenditures in 2007 were nearly five times of that in 
19607. The number of scientists and engineers engaged in R &D in the U.S. has grown from 
under 500,000 to 4.8 million in 2000 with an annual growth rate of 6.8% in contrast with 1.6% of 
the annual total employment growth rate. Other developed countries have experienced even larger 
R & D employment8. At the same time, patent grants and economic growth rates have been 
constant in most developed countries9 (Jones 1995, Segerstrom 1998).  
     Jones (1995), Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998) construct a semi-endogenous model to 
account for the puzzling trend. They obtain the result that the growth rate of output per capita is 
proportional to the growth rate of the population, instead of population size. However, these 
models contain the neoclassical model’s prediction that policies (such as R&D subsidies) have no 
impact on long-run economic growth. It is at odds with the spirit of the endogenous growth 
theory. By eliminating the growth effect of scale, the work of Aghion and Howitt (1998 ch.12), 
                                                 
7 U.S. R & D expenditure increased to $ 307,553 in 2007 from $65,155 in 1960 in 2000 constant dollars, 
according to the data from National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resource Statistics 
(NSF/SRS).   
8 National Science Foundation. 
9 According to the data from World Intellectual Property Organization, the growth of patent grants is 
relatively constant in most European countries from 1960 to 2005, if not declined. Patent grants grow 
persistently in U.S. and Japan. The GDP growth rate of U.S. has been constant (even slightly decreasing) 
from 1960 to 2005 according to the statistics of Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Dinoupolous and Thompson (1998), Peretto (1998) and Young (1998) propose that increases in 
the population raise number of products available in direct proportion, but leave research efforts 
(and therefore growth) unchanged. These models reintroduce the policy effects (e.g. R& D 
subsidies, support for high-technology manufacturing) on the long-run rate of growth (Helpman 
1992, Jones 1999, Rebeiro 2000). In addition, they obtain long-run growth in the absence of 
population growth.  
     Based on the idea-based structure of Romer’s (1990a) model and with the specification for the 
accumulation of human capital technically similar to Lucas (1988), the model of Ribeiro (2000) 
carries a surprising result that growth depends positively on the ratio of final-goods workers to 
researchers. This model allows for the effects of economic policy (a subsidy to the research 
sector) on the economic growth rate. This result implies complementarity between high-skill 
labor and low-skill labor.  
     Based on the complementary effect perspective of low-skill labor to high-skill labor, Benabou 
(1993) elaborates the negative effect of segregation on economic growth. If the low skilled 
persons are segregated in communities totally deprived of high-skill workers, the return to 
education for low-skill labor is negative. It serves as a disincentive for education investment of 
the poor population. Thus, the exodus of the high-skill group leads agents in the deteriorative 
communities to remain unskilled and drop out of the labor force. The reduction of the supply of 
the low-skilled workers then decreases the demand of the high-skill workers because low-skill 
labor is a complementary input for the high-skill labor. Hence, the incentives for individuals in 
high-skilled communities to invest in education decline. Therefore, total education investments of 
the society shrink, which slows down economic growth. Thus, Benabou provides a theory 
proposing a negative impact of segregation on aggregate economic growth through the 
complementary nature between high-skill and low-skill labors in labor market. That is, residential 
segregation induces a collapse of a city’s productive capability by reducing the supply of the low-
skill workers and ultimately the incentive of education investments of a society. The disruptive 
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consequence of segregation mainly lies in its disincentive impact on investments for human 
capital accumulation. Figure 2.3 shows Benabou’s theory. 
 Figure 2.3 The negative impact of residential segregation on economic growth 
     The first arrow in the relationship is the most important in Benabou’s theory. It leads to the 
subsequent consequences. However, Benabou did not explain why the return to education 
investments for the low-skill population might be negative when high-skill and low-skill labors 
are segregated. The well-developed spatial mismatch hypothesis provides the mechanism.  
2.4.2 Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis 
     The spatial mismatch hypothesis in social geography proposes that segregated residential 
structures (both by race and income) reduce employment opportunities for minorities and the 
poor. Living in high poverty neighborhoods is thought to undermine workforce participation 
primarily in two ways: by accentuating the physical distance between place of residence and jobs, 
and by limiting access to networks that link people into job opportunities (Kain 1968). The 
majority of research on this topic concludes physical distance from job openings has a negative 
effect on labor market outcomes (Holzer 1991, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998). “Although it is 
unlikely to be a complete explanation, this research is generally persuasive in showing that job 
accessibility—generally measured in spatial terms—is an important contributing factor to 
minorities’ labor market difficulties” (Fernandez and Su 2004 P.53).  
     Most research on spatial mismatch argues that race and social processes are more important in 
explaining the geographical barriers to employment for inner city residents, especially minorities 
(mainly African-Americans) (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998, Preston and Mclafferty 1999). These 
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studies conclude racial discrimination in employment and absence of place-based social networks 
are the primary explanations for employment and compensation variations among blacks and 
whites (Gabriel and Rosenthal 1996, Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996).  
     There is growing evidence that employers’ of non-skilled and semi-skilled jobs are affected by 
local circumstances (Aponte 1996, Hanson and Pratt 1995, Holzer and Ihlandfeldt 1996). For 
example, employers have been reported to weight different job applicants on the basis of their 
addresses, refusing to hire residents of public housing or from very poor neighborhoods 
(Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991, Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996). Also, employers fill job 
openings by relying on social trust accumulated with present employees, rather than through want 
ads (O’ Regan 1993). This makes it difficult for the residents of poor inner-city neighborhoods to 
find and keep employment because they lack local social networks as sources of information 
about job vacancies and as sources of referrals to local employers (Hanson and Pratt 1995, 
Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996).  
     Besides physical distance, racial discrimination and social network, Kasarda (1990) proposed 
economic restructuring contributes the job-housing mismatch. Economic restructuring leads to 
jobs and qualified workers moving in opposite direction (Kasarda 1990). Advances in computers 
and telecommunications in mid-1970s allowed firms to decentralize operations within 
metropolitan areas as well as across regions and around the world (Sassen 1991, Wyly et al 
1998). Emergence of a service economy driven by small to medium-sized firms propels the 
suburbanization of production services and low-wage services (Blair and Premus 1987, Mills 
1992), and consequently jobs, middle-classes and public services (Berry 1975, Teitz and Chapple 
1998, Wyly et al. 1998). Meanwhile, the traditional economy characterized by heavily unionized, 
high-wage, blue-collar factory jobs concentrated in central cities has eroded (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982, Wilson 1987). Central city residents, the traditional low-wage blue-collar 
workers, cannot move out to follow the jobs and middle-classes because of the constraints of 
community attachment, discrimination, or lack of information about job and housing 
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opportunities (Teitz and Chapple 1998). Thus, cities become the enclaves of the most 
disadvantaged who are isolated from the mainstream, hard to get employed and living in 
deteriorated conditions. 
     Hence, the spatial mismatch hypothesis proposes that the segregated and isolated minorities 
and poor and minorities find themselves in unproductive and deteriorating communities where 
employment is hard find because of physical distance barriers, discrimination in employment and 
housing, and lack of social networks and information. This part of the population is the source of 
low-skill and low-wage labor. When they are forced to stay out the labor market, they cannot gain 
any income to compensate the costs they invested for the quantity and quality of education they 
have. Thus, residential segregation induces negative returns to education for low-skill labor. Till 
now, the spatial mismatch hypothesis fills in the gap of the theory based on complementary effect 
perspective proposed by Benabou (1993) and Ribeiro (2000). This theoretical combination 
delicately elaborates the disruptive impact of residential segregation on aggregate economic 
growth. The second set of hypothesis of this dissertation is confidently developed accordingly10: 
H2a: Metropolitan areas highly segregated by race should be associated with lower economic 
growth rates. 
H2b: Metropolitan areas highly segregated by income should be associated with lower economic 
growth rates. 
H2c: Metropolitan areas highly segregated by skills should be associated with lower economic 
growth rates11. 
                                                 
10 Watson (2006) actually found a negative association between income segregation and metropolitan 
growth measured by population growth. 
11 Endogenous economic growth theories suggest knowledge spillovers associated with increased 
education can serve as the engine of growth for national and local economies. The dense concentration of 
educated people in spatially limited areas enhances these spillovers by permitting a great deal of 
interaction, which fosters new ideas, processes and products that may lead to faster productivity growth for 
urban firms (Carlino 1995, Rauch 1993). Individuals with high income, however, are usually highly 
educated or experienced, are concentrated and clustered in similar-ranked communities in the hierarchical 
residential structure. Personal interactions among residents hosted by location proximity exchange 
information and foster new ideas, processes and products. That means knowledge spillovers occur through 
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     This section describes how residential segregation as a disincentive to education investments 
for the poor and the entire population, ultimately slows down the aggregate economic growth 
through labor market inaccessibility for the minorities and the poor. Because of the well-
documented close association of residential segregation and education segregation, the 
mechanism of segregation that hinders economic growth through the education system is 
elaborated as follows. It is direct but also closely relates to the labor market.  
2.4.3 School Segregation 
          School segregation is associated and fostered by residential segregation. Public school 
failure concentrates in high poverty communities (Bifulco and Ladd 2006, Fry 2007). When 
schooling is locally funded, school district income (which is from local taxes) determines school 
spending and school quality. It in turn affects the education outcomes (Benabou 1996, Fernandez 
and Rogerson 1996). As a result, children from low-income families are concentrated in poor 
communities where few resources are spent on schooling. Since there is a strong relationship 
between school expenditure and education achievements, school attainments of poor children 
might fall for low teacher quality, teacher expectations of students and physical facilities. 
Previous research has found that the drop-out rate in severely distressed neighborhoods is three 
times more than that in non-poverty neighborhoods (Kasarda 1993).  
     Meanwhile, children from high-income families in white and suburban neighborhoods are 
concentrated in schools with adequate funding and with peers of similar socioeconomic 
background. This might increase their education achievements (Benabou 1994, Down 1994, 
Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1987). 
                                                                                                                                                 
social interactions among residents of the prestigious and middle prestige communities, which will 
facilitate both the productivity progress and economic growth. Thus a possible positive relationship might 
hold between the hierarchical residential structure and economic growth. However, the economic 
agglomeration literature doesn’t distinguish the concentration of workers from the concentration of 
residents. Hence, I hypothesize a negative association according to the related literature and will include 
indices of agglomeration effect to test the possibility of the positive connection. 
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     If education quality is a linear function of school fiscal resources, total school attainment 
might not change because the increase of education achievements of the high-income children 
might offset the declining schooling of the poor children (Mayer 2002). But the declining 
schooling of children of distressed communities is substantially important concerning the 
complementary relation between high-skill and low-skill labor for production; children living in 
poor communities might be the major source of low-skill workers. The deteriorating schools 
supported by high poverty neighborhoods enlarges the disparity between education qualities the 
poor children attained and the associated job requirements, in addition to the potential social 
problems associated with high school drop-out. If the education the low-income children get does 
not prepare them well to cope with the needs of the labor market, economic growth might slow 
down for lack of the production and business services from low-income positions. 
     Besides the school finance argument, it is well-established that both rich and poor children 
benefit from affluent neighbors. Those benefits can be derived from role-model effects and social 
networks (Jencks and Mayer 1990, Sampson and Laub 1994, Wilson 1987). Ainsworth (2002) 
found that neighborhood high-status residents have a significantly positive effect on students’ 
time spent on homework and math/reading achievements.  
     Racial and class makeup of students in schools is not only associated with test scores and drop 
out rates, but also influences the student’s college choice and school attainment (Wells and Crain 
1994). Research consistently finds African American students who move from segregated schools 
to desegregated schools are more likely to finish high school and go to college. They are also 
more likely to attend a desegregated college. In other words, desegregation practice affords black 
students the opportunity to develop confidence in their scholastic abilities and their adaptive and 
coping skills in majority white settings (Braddock 1980, Kaufman and Rosenbaum 1992). It also 
helps them gain social contacts and develop social networks that will help them attain higher 
occupational status and income later in their lives (Crain 1970, Dawkins 1991, Green 1982).  
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     School segregation and desegregation practices affect all groups of students, minorities and 
whites, rather than only minorities. Student body diversity promotes learning outcomes through 
students’ interactions across racial and ethnic lines, and ‘better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse environment and workforce, and better prepares them as professionals’ 
(Grutter v. Bollinger 2003, Orfield and Lee 2005). These benefits are significant, as major 
American businesses have made it clear that “skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, culture, ideas and 
viewpoints” (Grutter v. Bollinger 2003).  
     Hence, school segregation, facilitated by residential segregation, constrains the education and 
employment opportunities of minorities and poor and consequently limits their life chances. 
Following the complementary-effects arguments, school failure of poverty concentrated 
communities contributes to the shortage of low-skill labor and so decreases the demand of high-
skill labor, which ultimately creates a disincentive for educational investments of the entire 
society and disrupts the entire economic growth. On the other hand, school segregation negatively 
affects the educational achievement of the whole body of the students by inhibiting the growth of 
new knowledge and the adoption of the diverse environments. According to idea-based 
endogenous economic theory, knowledge progress drives economic growth. School segregation 
should be associated with lower economic growth. Therefore, both the complementary effect 
argument and the idea driven argument suggest the following hypothesis: 
H2d: Metropolitan areas with high level of school segregation should be associated with slower 
economic growth rates.  
   2.5 Central City-Suburban Disparity and Economic Growth 
 
 
     With the advancement of telecommunication technology and the development of 
transportation systems, the U.S. urban growth process has been dominated by suburbanization 
 
 
28
since 1950s. Its consequences are deteriorating central cities and the enlarging central city-
suburban disparities.  
     The remarkable geographical distinction in social, economic and fiscal resources between 
these two areas shapes the political power structure, determines policy priorities, and affects the 
efficiency of policy implementation in the U.S. urban areas. With the passing down of federal 
safety net to state and local governments,  major cities are more subject to the gyrations of local 
economies for revenue flow. Yet the out-flight of business and middle-class households erodes 
cities’ tax base. The shortage and insecurity of revenue resources constrain cities’ incentives and 
capabilities to satisfy the public’s demand for public services. In addition, the national economy, 
based on the fundamentally inequitable economic units, is more vulnerable and less resilient to an 
economic recession. Given the slim possibility of change of urban growth process and the lack of 
intergovernmental support, cities found they are in worse condition in this recession than their 
experiences in the midst of 1990-1991, even after controlling for the severity of the economic 
recession. The geographical and political separation within states and metropolitan areas makes it 
inefficient to make coherent economic-stimulating plans for economic recovery.  
     A growing prosperous central city and the approaching economies between the central city and 
its suburbs symbolize a healthy metropolitan economy. It is well documented that central cities 
and their adjacent suburbs are complementary economies instead of self-sufficient ones (Gottlieb 
2000, Mills 1990, Savitch et al. 1992 1993, Voith 1998). Yet a fast growing central city is not 
necessarily associated with a narrowed gap between the city and its suburbs. And the economy 
performance of a distressed city and its suburbs might be synonymous (Gottlieb 2000, Hill and 
Brennan 2005). The history of urban growth reveals that a thriving city and its latent suburbs 
might reflect the suburbs have not utilized the city resources sufficiently. While a deleterious city 
and the slow-growing suburbs might reveal the detrimental effect of a shrinking city to the 
regional economy. A distressed city and the growing suburbs present the fact that suburbs serve 
as the growth engine for a metropolitan area by depriving city resources. Suburban residents 
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enjoy the public services and facilities and earn income from central cities, yet they do not 
contribute tax revenue to central cities. This zero-sum urban growth pattern is widely questioned 
for its social, economic and political equity issues. The agglomeration economics and spatial 
spillovers effect perspective suggest that economically the divided urban growth pattern is 
inefficient, non-sustainable and not resilient. 
     Longstanding, inextricable and continually changing central city-suburban ties can be 
illustrated by the history of city growth. Besides the endowed advantages of geographical 
locations, natural resources and climate, cities formed and grew through industries and population 
flow and concentration. As agglomeration economics suggests, an industry presence in a city 
might be a result of the availability of natural resources, historical accident or simply by 
government policies. However, once an industry develops in a city, it will reproduce or attract 
outside firms in the same industry. By locating together, firms in the same industry can take 
advantage of the common labor pool, economies of scale of intermediate inputs production and 
lower transportation costs, such as the high-tech industry in Silicon Valley, the TV and motion 
picture industry in Los Angeles, and the auto industry in Detroit (Carlino 2005, Down 1994, 
Ihlanfeldt 1995, Krugman 1991a 1991b, O’Sullivan 1993).  
     Not only does the firm’s industry matter for city’s growth, but the size of the city itself also 
matters. We can only find some particular special services, such as financial and business 
services, in large cities because only large cities can provide sufficient client base for these firms 
in special business services to flourish. The rise of these types of special services in large cities is 
external to any single firm or industry as suggested by urbanization economics.  
     Besides serving as the necessary business client base, large population size and high 
population density is the endogenous engine for city growth. The physical proximity among a 
highly skilled population facilitates knowledge transfer and expedites knowledge creation, which 
is identified as knowledge spillover by agglomeration economists. Knowledge innovation 
originating from face-to-face communications among workers from different firms might lead to 
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unexpected combinations of seemingly unrelated ideas and may provide leaps to new goods or to 
new ways of producing existing goods (Beeson 1992, Glaeser 1993, Jacobs 1969).  Thus city 
growth shifts from firms’ proximity to suppliers and customers to proximity of highly skilled 
workers. Cities with a certain population size grow self-sustainably. It implies concentration of 
highly skilled workers is the determinant for city growth (Glaeser et al. 1992, Hill and Brennan 
2005, Rauch 1991). This is consistent with the arguments from endogenous economists. 
Endogenous economists present that social interactions among individuals are the microeconomic 
foundation for knowledge diffusion and innovation. It is the knowledge spillover effects that 
stimulate knowledge and ultimately economic output growth (Lucas 1988, Mathur 1999). 
Knowledge spillover effects associated with additional education serves as the engine of local and 
national economic growth.  
     This argument is confirmed by empirical evidence. Additional years of education increase 
total factor productivity substantially (Ciccone and Hall 1996, Rauch 1993). The dense 
concentration of educated people in spatially limited areas enhances these spillovers by 
permitting a great deal of interactions which foster new ideas, processes and products that may 
lead to faster productivity growth for urban firms (Carlino 1995). Therefore, attracting highly 
skilled workers is the theme for city policymakers with growth on the top of their agenda. 
     Yet some researchers point out that the agglomeration effect is limited because it is 
internalized to change the ratio of capital and labor. So city size will ultimately decline when the 
agglomeration effect is exhausted (Petrakos 1992). This might be true since cities do not expand 
their boundaries infinitely. Moreover, the traditional view suggests that a city’s level of 
population, employment and output stabilizes at a certain level for high living and business costs 
(rents) associated with congestion, which implies gains from agglomeration are ultimately offset.  
     The story described above reveals agglomeration effects associated with business and human 
capital concentration nurture city prosperity. Yet the congestion created by concentration urges 
city residents spin out. Researchers have documented that individuals (families) with higher 
 
 
31
human capital are more sensitive to the quality of neighborhoods than those with low human 
wealth. The better educated families (and individuals) thus move to suburbs to avoid congestion, 
noise and crime problems and to enjoy larger space and better living environment (Andrew 1994 
and Benabou1994). Following are the businesses either seeking lower production costs or 
targeting the out flight middle and upper classes for service provision. The once self-sufficient 
countryside became suburbs dependent on the city.  
     With the new construction of highway networks, the development of computers and 
telecommunication technologies, the availability of cheap FHA mortgage and the generous tax 
allowance, the once small-town suburbia grew into giant settlements. Suburban growth continues 
as former low-density suburbs became small cities. The two entities, city and suburbs, thrive into 
a commercial, cultural and political metropolis which replace that of a city. The role of city in 
urban development started to be falsely questioned and the status of suburbs is far over-stated.  
     Although cities have deteriorated while suburbs thrive, cities and suburbs are symbiotic 
instead of independent. The history of American urban growth reveals suburbs are fostered by 
business and knowledge agglomeration in the city. In other words, suburban growth roots in a 
prosperous city. As long as a strong central city is held, suburban prosperity could continue. 
Suburbs with a declining urban core are vulnerable and do not have long-term potential, because 
a blight central city cast a long shadow. Most business or individuals with high human capital 
would not move to a declining environment. 
     As elaborated above, the concentration of business and human capital serves as the engine of 
city growth. High skilled individuals have higher income and more wealth. The rise of real 
income leads to more demand for the variety of goods and services such as cultural and leisure 
activities including sports teams, gourmet restaurants and live theaters (Glaeser et al. 2001).  
These services are more plentiful in large cities for both of the big local market and the 
substantial economics of scale. With the middle and upper classes spreading out of the city, the 
luxury goods and services in central cities dwindle because of the shrinking client base. It again 
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reversely affects the location choice of individuals with higher income for fewer amenities and 
their less attractiveness of life style. Without a sustained flow of human capital, how can a city 
keep growing in a long term? Businesses will not select a decentralizing city as their location for 
scattered and smaller client base, and lower quality labor pool. The city thus deteriorates for its 
slim fiscal resources are not sufficient to provide attractive public services and maintain public 
infrastructure. This is detrimental to its suburbs. The deleterious city shadows the opportunities 
for suburban growth because of a negative image effect. For example, Headhunters find it 
difficult to lure top-talented people to the Detroit metropolitan area, even if the place is far away 
from Detroit city (Voith 1992). Thus the separation between cities and suburbs is destructive. 
These two entities constitute one economic market and only a vibrate city can harbor sustained 
suburban growth and then a prosperous metropolitan economy. 
     Studies testing the complementarity between central city and suburbs are overwhelmingly 
empirical. Hill and Brennan (2005) found a positive correlation of job growth between central 
cities and suburbs based on the analysis on 100 cities. They conclude cities and suburbs are one 
market for business location. Gottlieb (1998) reviewed thirteen articles in 1990s and found that a 
consistent positive correlation between central city and suburban performance, which means they 
are complements rather than substitutes. These empirical studies use population growth, 
employment growth, per capita income growth, stock of office and house values as the indices of 
economic performance12. Besides the positive correlation between these two urban areas, Voith 
(1998) builds a structural model and teases out the causal relationship between central city 
income growth and that of their suburbs. Instrumental estimation results indicate income growth 
in large cities enhances suburban growth, but income growth in small cities has little effect. He 
also found the correlation between central cities and suburbs has grown stronger over time. 
     Moreover, according to the spatial spillover argument, problems associated with urban decay 
will penetrate to inner-ring suburbs. Crime rates are high and property values are lower in suburbs 
                                                 
12 See table 1 in Gottlieb (1998) for more information. 
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that neighbor distressed cities (Brown 1982, Haughwout 1997, Voith 1996). Suburbs have to 
confront the fact that they cannot evade both the direct and indirect poverty-related expenditure 
by relaxing the legal mandate on income or healthcare (Gottlieb 2000, Pack 1998). Only 
eliminating the poverty is sufficient, although it is controversial about the costs and efficient ways 
of turning a dependent population into productive population.  
     Yet the interdependent economy between central cities and their suburbs, and the tax burden 
they share for re-distributive programs provides these two entities with the foundation to form 
political and administrative coalitions. It is the precondition to breakdown the vicious circle of the 
urban growth process which is likely to endure indefinitely: suburbs appropriate the benefits by 
their association with metropolises and evading their responsibilities; central cities suffer the 
trend of decay by their own negative synergies. Central cities are naturally endowed the location 
advantages, such as centrality and accessibility. The waste of these assets in American cities 
undermines regional economic performance. Thus, based on the arguments of agglomeration 
effects and spatial spillover effects, this dissertation develops the third set of hypothesis: 
 H3a: Metropolitan areas with large income disparities between central cities and suburbs should 
be associated with slower economic growth rates. 
H3b: Metropolitan areas with high poverty concentrations in central cities should be associated 
ith slower economic growth rates. 
  2.6 Institutions and Economic Growth 
 
 
2.6.1 Government Structure 
     The history of urban development in the U.S. has been characterized by searching for a way to 
organize governmental systems of cities and regions to the territorial reach of population 
settlement and economic activities. Urban growth and the interplay of diverse influences of urban 
conditions, determines urban government structure (Foster 1997, Hamilton 2000).  Urban growth, 
together with higher population densities and increased social interactions, generates a need for 
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collectivized urban service provision (Foster 1993, Monkkonen 1988, Paddison 1983). The 
disparity between inner cities and their suburbs, or between poor and rich municipalities, has been 
a strong impediment to initiatives on matters of regional significance (Frisken 2001, Kantor 2006, 
Savitch and Vogel 2004).  Both city officials and suburban officials object to or resist closer ties 
with each other because city populations are increasingly differentiated from suburban residents 
by income and ethnicity. State governments are reluctant to create units that could rival them in 
importance (Frisken 2001, Nice 1983). The pull factors of dependent-induced urban regionalism, 
public service provision, social problem alleviation and various political impediments have 
created diverse urban government structures and revitalized scholarly research about its 
efficiency and equity.  
     A growing literature addresses the links between government structure, household location 
choice and urban growth (Foster 1993, Nelson 1990, Nelson and Foster 1999, Ward 1987). It 
conveys conceptual agreement that government structure may influence growth by creating a 
particular institutional and policy environment for development; government entities can attract 
(or repel) households and firms which are the building blocks of growth (Danielson and Doig 
1982). This literature is advanced through the political fragmentation debate.  
     Public choice arguments posit that fragmented systems of metropolitan governance are 
superior to consolidated systems because they are more democratic and efficient to operate 
(Frisken and Norris 2001, Tiebout 1956, Warren 1966). Assuming households have different 
preferences for service/tax bundles of public goods, metropolitan areas with fragmented systems 
are more democratic because they allow urban households to choose their resident location from a 
large number of communities. Given sufficient population, fragmentation produces a wide variety 
of communities that provide diverse public goods packages offering great potential to satisfy 
household preferences. In addition, this argument holds that greater interjurisdictional 
competition impels public goods suppliers to efficiently provide the level and quality of public 
goods consumers demand (Dye 1990, Kenyon 1997, Nunn, Klacik, and Schoedel 1996, Schneider 
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1989). Hence, areas with fragmented governance are theorized to attract more population than 
less fragmented areas (Foster 1993).  
     The public choice paradigm also asserts that overlapping governments signal responsiveness 
of governments to heterogeneous demands and recognition that different urban services achieve 
efficient production levels at different scales (Parks and Oakerson 1989). This assertion derives 
from the notion that different urban services have different geographic scales for efficient 
production as well as different levels of externalities. Fragmented government structures are 
thought to be attractive to pro-growth interests (investors) because they facilitate playing one 
community off against the other to obtain tax breaks, offer lenient environmental regulations, and 
provide other economic inducements unlikely in a less competitive system (Kenyon and Kincaid 
1991, Van Dyne 1997). Local merchant capitalists favor fragmented structures as a stimulative 
environment for growth and a shield against redistributive policies typical of regionalized systems 
(Logan and Molotch 1987, Olin 1991, Orfield 1997).  
     Several critiques of the public choice argument help to explain why fragmented government 
systems failed to bring an end to the search for new ways to address problems identified with 
city-region expansion (Denters and Mossberger 2006, Frisken and Norris 2001, Keating 1995, 
Long 1972, Stephens and Wikstrom 2000, Stone 2005). Democratic theory has long posited that 
local decision making offers more opportunities for meaningful civic engagement. Citizens 
participate more in smaller municipalities (Oliver 2001). People in small communities are likely 
to have geographically proximate social networks. In other words, people in small communities 
are likely to know their neighbors or run into acquaintances in public places. An active social 
network and small physical size makes civic participation attractive. Residents in large 
communities tend to be less familiar with people they live near, are less likely to have friends in 
common and social relations between neighbors are less likely to be geographically proximate. In 
addition, by living in a big community, attending organizational meetings are more time-
consuming or costly because of the drive time, traffic, and parking fee. In short, the hassles and 
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many distractions of big-city living might reduce the incentives of people to get involved in their 
community. 
     Yet Kelleher and Lowery (2004) did not find that the simple size of municipal government 
influences participation. Instead, they found that urban county institutions moving toward less 
fragmentation with greater concentration could improve local political participation13. This is 
contrary to Oliver (2001). In addition, the underlying mechanism of the Tiebout explanation 
assumes the evaluation of core municipal services is the strongest determinant of the likelihood 
for the citizens to move (Bickers, Salucci and Stein 2006). Yet results from the spatial-lag model 
and the analysis of interviews and news reports reveal that there are tax competitions among 
municipalities in Chicago metropolitan area on lower-mobile property tax, but not on the high-
mobile sales tax. It indicates voice might be more prevalent for public service provision than exit 
(Hendrick, Wu and Jacob 2007). 
     The main issue is that fragmented regimes shaped the landscape of U.S. urban growth (Lewis 
1996, Rusk 1995). Dominant local coalitions differ from municipality to municipality. The 
sorting of population into local governments along lines of race and class has created 
extraordinary levels of homogeneity that are strongly associated with reduced levels of citizen 
engagement (Swanstrom 2006). The fact that African-Americans have gained many local political 
offices does not mean the politics of central cities are healthy. Little meaningful party 
competition in central cities minimizes the incentives for political elites to mobilize the 
disadvantaged, which harms the poor (Keiser 1997). In fact, fragmented government systems not 
only contribute to the democracy problem, but also fail to deal adequately with growing 
disparities in the financial and social well-being of older US central cities relative to their 
suburbs. Municipal fragmentation stratifies communities, and the stratification tends to increase 
during periods of rapid growth (Hill 1974, Vicino 2008, Weiher 1991). During regional growth 
                                                 
13 Kelleher and Lowery (2004) found moving either toward greater fragmentation with less concentration or 
toward less fragmentation with greater concentration could improve local political participation. However, 
fracturing the central cities into smaller units occurs infrequently.  
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spurts, suburban communities preserve their status by excluding households with low 
socioeconomic status and force new jobs or residences farther out, toward the metropolitan 
periphery. City governments then experience difficulties dealing with growing social problems 
out of declining tax bases (Campbell and Sacks 1967).  
     In fragmented systems, local governments, like individuals and firms, act in their own self-
interests and impose costs (externalities) on others causing the region’s wealth, and by 
implication the incomes of individuals, to suffer (Nelson and Foster 1999). Interjurisdictional 
competition for development induced by fragmented governments is criticized for promoting zero 
-sum games. It leads to inefficiently and inequitably located facilities, encourages haphazard 
development and overzoning of commercial and industrial land uses, and induces local 
governments to relax environmental standards (Barlow 1991, Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez 2005, 
Peirce, Johnson and Hall 1993). For example, a study conducted by Lubell et al. (2005) on 
counties in Florida found counties with active business interests are more vulnerable to the 
politics of growth machine, and are constrained for environment conservation polices. According 
to the results based on 14 cities comparison, Rusk (1995) presented that local governments highly 
fragmented are usually incapable of adopt integrating strategies. The unified local government 
has the zoning and planning power to implement policies enhancing racial and economic 
integration. Regional governments are more inclined to rationalize metropolitan-wide 
development, narrow intraregional disparities and spur investment in central city revitalization 
(Downs1994, Lewis 1996, Orfield 1997, Pastor, Dreier, Grigsby and Lopez-Garciz 1997, Vicino 
2008). 
     Moreover, the argument for integrated government arrangements stresses that larger 
jurisdictions have the ability to realize the economics of scale in production, and to internalize the 
inefficient externalities associated with smaller, more numerous government units (Frisken 1991, 
Rusk 1993 1995, Wingo 1972). Regional government structures might have the motivation and 
authority over allocation of one or more resources that everyone needs to sustain economic 
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activities (Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez 2005). Integrated political structures enable the provision 
of area-wide services that individual municipalities are unwilling or unable to provide on their 
own, thereby serving a wider variety of intrametroplitan interests and enhancing the regional 
quality of life (Frisken 1991). Regional concerns such as water, economic development, airports, 
transit and pollution control is ensured by unified governments with regional consideration 
(Adams 1997, Bollens 1997). Improved service coordination, increased regulatory consistency 
and a reduced number of required government interactions associated with integrated political 
structure should reduce frustration and lower development and investment risks, thus attracting 
growth (Barlow 1991).  
     Empirical evidence from case studies, business surveys and aggregate analysis yield few 
conclusions linking metropolitan government structures, central city-suburb disparity and 
economic growth. A case study found no relationship between the 1973 consolidation of the city 
of Jacksonville with Duval County, Florida. However, the consolidation of the city of 
Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana was positively associated with economic growth 
(Blomquist and Parks 1995, Feiock and Carr 1997). Survey findings reveal strong support among 
business and community elites for regional government (Henderson and Rosenbaum 1973, 
Teaford 1979). On the metropolitan scale, the potential for one-stop permitting is apparently more 
attractive to business interests than is the opportunity to play one community than another 
(Edwards and Bohland 1991). When environmental problems have passed some threshold of 
dissatisfaction, residents are more likely to support regional governments to manage the issues 
affecting regional quality of life, such as traffic congestion and pollution (Gerston and Haas 1993, 
Nelson and Foster 1999). Evidence from aggregate studies is also ambiguous. Rusk (1993, 1995) 
reports politically integrated metropolitan areas are associated with lower central city-suburb 
disparity, lower residential segregation and higher population growth. McCarville (2004) 
identified the negative association between government fragmentation and economic growth. 
Savitch and Vogel (2004) found city-county consolidation does not lessen urban sprawl. It 
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implies that integrated government does not mitigate residential segregation.  Results of Foster 
(1993) provide mixed results: supportive to fragmentation, high proportions of unincorporated 
population is associated with lower growth rates. Yet metropolitan areas with regionalized school 
districts relative to municipalities grew more rapidly.  
     Despite the provoking scholarly debate on government fragmentation verses integration, and 
the mixed empirical evidence, the consistent support for integrated government systems from the 
business and community elites, and the recent arguments for regional governance suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
     H4a: Metropolitan areas with fragmented government systems are associated with lower 
economic growth rates.  
2.6.2 Annexation Policy 
     Annexation has long been the predominant form of municipal growth (Liner 1990, Klaff and 
Fuguitt 1978, Thomas 1984). “Growth in incorporated places can be sustained either by an 
increase in density or by consumption of more space at the periphery of the urban area.” (Forstall 
1972 p.236) Although there are little unincorporated area available for annexation as Hawley 
(1950) stated, annexation has been the principal means of population growth for incorporated 
places from 1950-1970 (Bollens 1949, Bromley and Smith 1973, Kaufman and Schnore 1975, 
Klaff and Fuguitt 1978). While competing “solutions”, such as city/county consolidation and the 
creation of regional government structures have received greater attention, municipal annexation 
has remained the most favored and effective method cities have for jurisdictional expansion. It 
has been important for the city to protect the economic base through recapturing higher income 
residents and business that have left the municipality and through capturing new urban fringe 
residents who have migrated from other areas (Carr and Feiock 2001, Liner and Mcgregor 1996). 
Fringe area residents coordinate annexation activities for the possibility to obtain a higher level of 
public services. Through the process of annexation, metropolitan leaders have been able to 
develop a regional structure to limit fiscal and racial segregation (Duncan et al. 1962, Powell 
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2000, Rusk 1993 1995). Like other forms of government, the ability to annex adjacent territory 
reduces fragmentation of urban areas and the ability of different demographic groups to enact 
insular policies. It also empowers the central city to prudently control regional growth. 
     In the aggregate, municipal annexations have affected more people and greater area than any 
form of government reorganization. Therefore, annexation is the rule for incorporated places in 
the United States and must be considered in analyzing the economic and political development of 
cities (Carr and Feiock 2001, Kaufman and Schnore 1975, Klaff and Fuguitt 1978, McKenzie 
1933).  
     Yet despite the ever-increasing use of annexation, the experience across individual states 
remains uneven. Legislative provisions governing annexation are numerous and differ widely 
between adjoining states, and between metropolitan communities (Galloway and Landis 1986). 
An understanding of the variety of state statues and their effects on annexation activities enables 
policy analysts to advise legislators and other decision makers about alternatives and the probable 
effects of changes in policy (Palmer and Lindsey 2001). The literature widely holds how 
successful municipalities can expand their boundaries partly depends on the state and local 
institutions and the types of annexation statue (Galloway and Landis 1986, Liner 1990, Liner and 
Mcgregor 1996, MacManus and Thomas 1979). There is a long-standing belief that more liberal 
annexation laws—those that put few constraints on annexation—will result in more annexation 
(Bollen 1949). Annexation statues should give municipalities strong powers to annex while 
imposing some restrictions such as contiguity and character of the land annexed (Reynolds 1992). 
State laws on annexation activities have a significant impact on annexation, although early 
attempts failed to determine the impact of state statue (Carr and Feiock 2001, Liner 1990, 
MacManus and Thomas 1979, Palmer and Lindsey 2001). For example, Dye (1964) classified 
cities according to legal constraints on annexation and concluded that laws did not seem to have 
much of a restrictive impact on cities’ annexation activities from 1950 to 1960. MacManus and 
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Thomas (1979) analyzed annexation activities in 243 U.S. cities and failed to uncover 
relationships between annexation activities and state annexation laws. 
     To date, empirical research linking state-level incentives/constraints and local boundary 
expansion has generally relied on Sengstock’s typology. Sengstock’s topology groups state 
annexation laws according to the locus of the authority for authorizing municipal annexation: 
legislative, judiciary, quasi-legislative bodies, municipalities, or the property owners in the area 
proposed for annexation (Sengstock 1960). Sengstock (1960) classified state annexation laws into 
five categories: 
Municipal Determination (MD):  The extension of municipal boundaries through the unilateral 
action of local governing bodies. 
Popular Determination (PD): Annexation decisions are made by local “residents” through 
referendum or petition; depending on the statue. “Residents” can be defined as municipal 
electorate, the owners and inhabitants of the annexed area, and/or the electorate of the diminished 
territory.  
Judicial Determination (JD): Courts are empowered to determine if annexation will occur, using 
guidelines and criteria established by the legislature. 
Legislative Determination (LD): In states where annexation procedures are too burdensome or 
nonexistent, municipal boundary changes may be made by special act of the state legislature in 
response to urgent or particular circumstances. 
Quasi-legislative Determination (QD): This form of determination involves creation of 
independent, nonjudicial boards or tribunals to determine whether annexation or other boundary 
changes shall occur. 
     Since it was published, Sengstock’s topology has become the most often used and citied 
classification system for annexation procedures. Although some argue that Sengstock 
classification is a poor indicator for annexation activity, more researchers maintain its 
determinate role (Dusenbury 1980, Galloway and Landis 1986).  
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     Yet tests of the precise role of Sengstock’s topology have produced conflicting results. Liner 
(1990 1993) and Liner and Mcgregor (1996) found that cities allowed to annex land areas under 
municipal determination provisions annexed at higher rates than cities that annexed under 
predominantly under other types of laws. Cities that annexed under judicial determination 
provisions were found to annex land areas at lower rates than cities that annexed under other 
types of laws.  Galloway and Landis (1986) confirmed the argument that more progressive 
annexation approaches which place greater decision-making power over annexation in the hands 
of local government or in third-party judicial or quasi-legislative bodies will lead to a broader 
involvement of a city in annexation practices. However, their analysis supports the theory that 
popularly determined annexation practices diminish the opportunities and frequencies of city 
boundary change. Facer II (2006) maintained that laws designed to facilitate annexation are likely 
to be associated with high levels of annexation activity. However, this study did not find the 
restrictive effects of the legal constraints. In addition, Carr and Feiock (2001) demonstrated that 
procedural constraints expected to reduce annexation activity were instead shown to stimulate 
greater numbers of annexations. In short, previous literature confirms that state statues facilitating 
annexation has stimulated municipal annexation activities. Yet consensus has not been reached 
about whether procedural constraints retard municipal boundary expansion. Based on the 
discussion above, it is hypothesized that:  
     H4b: Metropolitan areas under liberal state annexation laws are associated with higher 
growth rates than those with conservative state annexation laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
      
 
     My goal is to explore the relationship between the initial spatial income inequality and the 
subsequent economic growth measured by average annual growth rate of real personal income 
per capita between decennial census years across Metropolitan areas in the U.S. Following 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), I treat technological progress as a function of the stock of human 
capital. According to the theories about the effect of income inequality on economic growth and 
the linkage between central cities and suburbs, physical capital for a Metropolitan Area is 
determined by income inequality, technological progress and the institutional preference for 
investments. Combining these theories, section 3.1 elaborates the econometric equation to test the 
hypotheses. Variables operationalizing the estimation model and their data sources are explained 
in section 3.2.
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3.1 Estimation Framework 
 
 
     This dissertation employs an endogenous economic growth model to examine the research 
question.  
     The standard growth accounting methodology with human capital specifies an aggregate 
production function in which per capita income, Yt, is dependent on productivity progress, At, 
labor, Lt, physical capital, Kt, and human capital, Ht. Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology, 
t
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ttt HLKAY ε= , and taking log differences, the relationship for long-term growth can be 
expressed as 
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14                                                                                   (1) 
    However, not all empirical studies have found significant role of human capital accumulation 
in the standard growth equation (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992). 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) argued that simply including an index of human capital/education as an 
additional input would represent a gross misspecification of the productive process. They 
suggested that education facilitates the adoption and implementation of new technologies. 
According to the effect of agglomeration economies, the average stocks of human capital rather 
than the human capital accumulation have contributed to income growth substantially. Recent 
endogenous growth theories have modeled 
A
A
&
 directly as a function of the education level H, 
emphasizing the endogenous nature of growth and technical progress (for example, Lucas 1988). 
While treating the total quantity of 
A
A
&
  as exogenous, Romer (1990) studied the allocation of H 
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between goods production and inventive activities which enhance the growth of A, is determined 
by market incentives.  
     For simplicity, this project abstracts from these important issues relating to the allocation and 
production of H. I assume that H is exogenously given and a higher level of H causes a higher 
level of
A
A
&
 . As some endogenous growth economists present, human capital can influence 
technology growth by two mechanisms. One is that human capital influences the relative growth 
rate of technology directly by enhancing the ability of a country/region to develop its own 
technological innovations. The other is that it increases a country/region’s capability to adapt and 
implement technologies developed elsewhere, i.e. the ‘catch-up’ effect. Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994) specified the growth of technology for country/region i as below: 
max[( ) / ]i i i i
A c gH mH Y Y Y
A
= + + −
&
                                                       (2) 
where c represents exogenous technological progress, gHi represents endogenous technological 
progress associated with a country/region to innovate directly, and ]/)[( max iii YYYmH −  
represents the diffusion of technology from abroad/outside.  
     Because technological gaps across U.S. metropolitan areas are not as substantially significant 
as those among countries, this study will not consider the ‘catch up’ component, 
]/)[( max iii YYYmH −  to simplify the theoretical model. Therefore, equation (2) can be written as 
equation (2a) as follows: 
i
A c gH
A
= +
&
                                                                  (2a)                                             
     The exogenous technological progress c can be interpreted broadly as the output of 
metropolitan characteristics such as culture, history, climate, demographic, social and political 
environment etc. Thus c can be modeled as a weighted sum of K metropolitan-specific factors 
represented by variables X1, X2,… Xk: 
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itkkitit XXXc βββ +++= ...2211                                                                      (2 b)    
     Thus the technological progress equation became equation (3): 
i
A gH X
A
λ= +
&
                                                                                                  (3)    
     Among all the metropolitan characteristics, I would like to briefly address the effect of the 
political environment on technological progress cross the metropolitan areas. The economic 
growth literature documents that institutions, e.g. whether a country with democratic political 
framework affect technological progress. Under the metropolitan area condition, the quality of 
professional service from the governments and how quickly governments respond to the needs of 
the research oriented industries might impact regional technological innovation (for example, 
research parks). Therefore, political environment is considered in this project.   
      We now turn to determine factors affecting physical capital growth across the metropolitan 
areas. Conventional wisdom suggests that investment is driven and made possible by profits 
(Schumpeter 1939). However, only when new techniques of production are employed to produce 
a certain product or if a new product is introduced, can profit arise. So it is the change in technical 
knowledge that is responsible for the change in the stock of producer goods (Adelman 1961). 
Following the standard economic growth accounting equation, with the assumption that saving 
completely goes to investment, physical capital growth is defined as the savings (investment) 
rate,
Y
S
, where S is the saving/investments of an economy and Y is the total output.  Physical 
capital growth therefore positively relates to the growth of total factor productivity.  
     There is a common belief among political economists that the rich save proportionately more 
than the poor, so that greater inequality tends to generate higher savings. Moreover, the 
investment ratio can be higher as the capitalist can ‘exploit’ the mass of poor labor when the 
inequality is high. Therefore, the overall effect of income inequality on investment is positive.  
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      However, all these arguments are based on cross-national studies, where the majority of 
investments are made by internal production units. In an open economy such as a metropolitan 
area, new investments might come from external investors. Sure, technological progress is 
important for the physical capital growth of an area, but it is uncertain how income inequality 
affects physical capital growth.  
     Moreover, as elaborated in Chapter 2, the decline of central cities and increasing disparity of 
central-city and suburbs (CSD) substantially affect the physical capital growth of an MSA. When 
investors choose an investment location, they consider the entire urban area as a whole instead of 
only the suburban areas of the MSA. The deteriorated central cities and large CSD impede the 
incentives of investors to invest in central cities. If the central city is concentrated with poverty, it 
is likely to have poor “fiscal health” and lack public funds to provide adequate public services 
(Ladd and Yinger 1989 p.9).  In order to survive with declining revenues and surging public 
service demand, local governments tighten their belts with fiscal austerity initiatives: closing 
public hospitals, reducing library hours, deferring maintenance on aging sewers, playgrounds, and 
parks, and reducing the numbers of public employees (Swanstrom et al. 2002). Thus, the 
infrastructure of poor central cities is deleterious and so the residents get dwindled public services 
and limited access to good education. Aging infrastructure and lack of a qualified labor pool then 
inhibits investments to the whole urban area. Therefore, the central-city and suburb disparity 
(CSD) can have a negative impact on the investment ratio.  
     According to Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), human capital stock has is a significant 
determinant of physical capital growth. Lucas (1988) suggested the reason physical capital does 
not flow to poor countries might be because those countries are poorly endowed with factors 
complementary to physical capital, such as human capital, political stability, the size of middle 
class, etc. Physical capital needs human capital to master new technologies to realize the higher 
marginal product in areas that lack of physical capital.  
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     Consider the urban areas within the U.S., industrial structure might be an important factor to 
attract external investments. Agglomeration economics states that an industry or several related 
industries concentrate in one geographic area so as to gain economies of scale and reduce the 
production costs and transaction costs. Transportation costs can be reduced by industries 
concentrating in an area nearside the demand market, and by producers and suppliers co-locating 
(Krugman 1991a). Industries can share a labor pool to reduce labor costs by concentrating in one 
area (Krugman 1991b).  
     More important, industrial concentration can accelerate the flow of ideas and perpetuate 
technological and institutional innovations, which is the spill-over effect of human capital 
concentration (Glaeser 2000). Therefore, industrial structure might affect external investments 
through inducing or hindering agglomeration effect. Thus, physical capital growth can be 
interpreted as equation (4): 
( , , , , )K K A Inequality CSD H Industries
K
=
&
                                              (4) 
where inequality indicates income inequality, industries means industrial structure in a 
metropolitan area. 
     Substituting equation (3) and (4) into equation (1), and incorporating the vector of spatial 
income inequality (SII)15, the metropolitan economic growth can be described as equation (5)16: 
1 ( 1) 2 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)T i T i T i i T i
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          (5) 
     Note that this model indicates how the initial values of independent variables affect economic 
growth. While it is true that economic growth might affect income inequality and residential 
segregation, this is a recursive relation rather than a simultaneous one, hence this model avoids 
                                                 
15 As chapter 2 illustrated, the vector of spatial income inequality include residential segregation (both race 
and income), income disparity between central city and suburbs, and political institution variables closely 
associated with residential segregation. 
16 Industrial structure variables are treated as one of the metropolitan characteristics, the metrics of X, thus 
it does not appear in the final equation.  
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problems associated with endogeneity or simultaneity associated with these five primary 
independent variables. 
     Using this theoretical framework, this dissertation conducts three separate Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) analyses on census data from three decades, 1980, 1990 and 2000. It will then 
compare the results to identify the effects of spatial income inequality on the metropolitan 
economic growth and to examine the robustness of the results.  
    These analyses cover a total of 331 US metropolitan areas both Metropolitan Statistic Areas 
(MSAs) and Primary Metropolitan Areas (PMSAs)17. Thirty-one MSAs in Puerto Rico are not 
incorporated in this study.  
     I refer all metropolitan areas as MAs and define them according to the definition of the county 
composition of MAs used in U.S. Census 2000. Because county boundaries are relatively stable, 
this project uses county boundaries to coordinate the boundary change of MAs.  
3.2 Data and Variable Description  
 
      
     Data for this study come from a large variety of sources: the Regional Economic Information 
System (REIS) of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 1969-2005), 
the Census of Population and Housing Summary Tape File 3A (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1980, 
1990 and 2000), the Census of Government (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1977, 1987 and 1997)18, 
Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change Project (Lewis Mumford Center), Neighborhood Change 
Database (Urban Institute), America’ Votes (David Leip 2003)19 and some articles. Data from all 
the sources were compiled together within the estimation framework to perform the analyses. 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
                                                 
17 This study won’t include NECTAs because: 1. this study uses counties as the basic unit to calculate some 
indices and keep the MSAs definition consistent through different time period. 2. All counties are already 
included in the MSAs and PMSAs.  
 
 
18 The author appreciates the Census of Bureau providing their internal files of government organizations. 
19 The author is grateful for Dr. Steve Fernandez for purchase of the data from David Leip Company. 
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     The dependent variable is measured by the average annual growth rate of real personal income 
per capita during 2000-2005 (for 2000 year data analysis), 1990-1999 (for 1990 decade analysis) 
and 1980-1989 (for 1980 decade analysis)20. Nominal personal income data is from REIS. This 
project used GDP price index from 1980 to 2005 to adjust the inflation effects. Consistent with 
the 1999 MA definition from the Census, this study aggregates county-level data to the MA level 
to keep MA boundaries consistent during these twenty five study years.  
3.2.2. Spatial Income Inequality Variables      
     Incorporating spatial inequality into the endogenous economic growth model is one 
contribution of this dissertation. Spatial inequality means residential segregation, student 
segregation and central city-suburb income disparity. Residential segregation is measured by 
three variables: a racial dissimilarity index (RDI), an income dissimilarity index (IDI) and a skills 
dissimilarity index (SDI). Central city-suburb income disparity (CSD) and poverty concentration 
are indices for the income distribution between central cities and suburban areas.  The student 
dissimilarity index indicates student segregation. Government fragmentation and annexation 
policies are evaluated as the institutional dimension of spatial income inequality. GINI 
coefficients and poverty rates are the measurements for income inequality. An examination of 
each variable and a description of the data are outlined below. 
Racial Segregation 
     There is a large literature on how ethnic and residential segregation should be measured and 
conceptualized. Massy and Denton (1988) synthesized the diverse literature and report five 
segregation dimensions derived from an examination of 20 measures of residential segregation. 
They are evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization and clustering. These dimensions are 
distinct and identify separate components of segregation. Evenness refers to any difference in the 
                                                 
20 I also tested average growth rate in five years, from 1990 to 1995 and from 1980 to 1985 as the 
dependent variables in 1990 and 1980 analyses accordingly, to keep the models consistent. The results are 
close to those from models with ten years growth rates. In addition, ten-year growth rates provide a clearer 
and continuous picture of economic performance. Thus, this project chose average growth rates as 
dependent variables for 1990 and 1980 decade analyses.    
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distribution of two groups (or one group and the remainder of the population) across spatial units 
(such as census tracts in this dissertation) into which an urban area is divided and on which the 
population is reported in censuses. Exposure means the probability of contact—or interaction—
between either two members of the same group or two members of different groups. 
Concentration indicates the amount of physical space occupied by a given number of individuals 
from a particular ethnic group. Centralization denotes the location of the areas occupied by a 
group and is measured as the proximity and/or accessibility of those areas to the city center. 
These four measurements consider the population composition, density, and location of the 
spatial units but pay no attention to the relative location of those units to one another. A group 
may be isolated in census tracts that contain only members of that group. If these tracts are 
concentrated into one part of an urban area with each neighboring another, this area is clustered.  
     However, using factor analysis on 20 racial segregation measurements based on census data 
from 1980, 1990 and 2000, Johnson (2007) found that these five dimensions can be reduced to 
two factors: separateness and location. Separateness covers unevenness, isolation and clustering. 
It refers to the degree to which members of an ethnic group live apart from the reminder of the 
population in a coherent block of urban territory. Location includes concentration and 
centralization and signifies the degree to which members of the group are congregated 
(irrespective of their degree of isolation) into high-density areas. This result is similar to that 
reported in Reardon and O’Sullivan’(2004) and Reardon and Firebaugh (2002). This study 
mainly focuses on the separateness of racial segregation and both dimensions of income 
segregation because income segregation by place of residence is the main theme of this research. 
     The racial dissimilarity index (RDI) is the most commonly used index for racial segregation 
and is used in this dissertation. It is a measurement of evenness21. The formula of racial 
dissimilarity index is: 
                                                 
21 The racial exposure index and the racial isolation index were examined based on census data of 1980, 
1990 and 2000. The correlation of racial dissimilarity index and racial exposure/isolation index is about .70 
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W
W
B
B
RDI ii
i
−= ∑2
1
 
Where Bi  is the black population on tract i , B is the total black population of an MA. Wi is the 
white population on tract i and W is the white population of an MA22. Data in 1980, 1990 and 
2000 are from the Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change Project of the Lewis Mumford Center.  
Income Segregation  
     The need to eliminate spatial poverty concentration has been emphasized by urban and 
regional policy debates. However, scholars have not achieved consensus about how to measure 
income segregation. With one of the entropy indices popularized by Theil (1967, 1972), the 
relationship between income inequality and neighborhood segregation is generally illustrated by 
simply decomposing the income inequality metric (I0) into a “within-neighborhood” component 
(IW) which captures the weighted sum of income inequality within each neighborhood and a 
“between neighborhood” component (IB) which captures the variability in neighborhood per 
capita incomes relative to the region-wide mean (Dawkins 2007, Shorrocks and Wan 2005). For 
example, Jargowsky’s (1996) neighborhood sorting index (NSI) is equal to the square root of the 
ratio of between neighborhood income variance to total income variance. These measurements 
are criticized for their incapability to account for the spatial arrangement of neighborhoods, or the 
so-called “checkerboard problem” (Dawkins 2004, Morrill 1991, White 1983)23. Charkravorty 
(1996) proposed a spatially weighted measurement to quantify the extent of the checkerboard 
phenomenon. However, this spatially weighted matrix approach suffers a limitation: it is 
burdensome to apply this index to a large spatial scale. For example, if I wanted to utilize the 
index for this dissertation project, I would need to figure out all the neighboring tracts for each 
                                                                                                                                                 
in 1990 and 2000. It is .95 in 1980. Therefore, this dissertation used racial dissimilarity index to indicate 
racial residential segregation. 
22 The author tested white-Hispanic, black-Hispanic dissimilarity indices. They are not significant and did 
not improve the model performance. So this dissertation mainly focuses on the white-black dissimilarity 
index.  
 
23 For detailed explanation pleasure refer to Dawkins (2007) pp.257. 
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census tract, and then do the calculation. Since the electronic boundary file of census tracts across 
the U.S. in 1980 is not publicly accessible, applying this index in this project is almost 
impossible. 
     The Centile Gap Index (CGI) proposed by Watson (2006) estimates how far the average 
family income within a tract deviates in percentile terms from the median family income in the 
tract, compared to how far it would deviate under perfect integration. The advantage of CGI is 
that if income distribution widens but families do not move, measured segregation is unchanged. 
There are other income segregation indices developed by Moran (1950) and Geary (1954) 
through spatial autocorrelation, which can be used to compare variability in per capita incomes 
among nearby neighborhoods with total variability in per capita incomes region-wide. Since all 
the indices have advantages and limitations and there is no agreement about the standard 
measurement, the dissimilarity index is used as the index for income segregation. The advantage 
of the dissimilarity index is that it is commonly used in the literature and it is easy to understand. 
Further, it is consistent with the measurement of racial segregation. The limitation of dissimilarity 
index is that we have to arbitrarily divide family (or household) income into poor and rich, which 
masks some information that other indices can provide by counting income as a continuous 
variable. In addition, the income dissimilarity index tends to underestimate the impacts of income 
transfers among adjacent neighborhoods relative to more distant neighborhoods (Dawkins 2004). 
The income dissimilarity index can reveal income transfers only when income is transferred from 
a neighborhoods with per capita income higher (or lower) than the average for the entire 
metropolitan area to one that is lower than or higher than the metrowide average. If the variability 
in neighborhood per capita income is a function of the distance between neighborhoods, this 
transfer bias takes on a spatial dimension, because in the segregated condition, neighborhoods at 
either extreme of the neighborhood per capita income are more likely to be clustered. Yet given 
its popularity and its convenience to calculate, dissimilarity index between rich and poor is 
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chosen as income segregation index. In order to compensate the limits of this single 
measurement, the dissimilarity index between high-skill and low-skill labors is also calculated.  
     The formula of income dissimilarity is: 
R
R
P
P
IDI ii
i
−= ∑2
1
   where   
Pi   indicate poor families on tract i,   P is the total poor families of an MA. Ri indicate rich 
families on tract i and R are the total rich families of an MA24. 
     Poor and rich is defined by the census poverty line for a four-member family. Following the 
definition of the Metropolitan Racial and Ethnical Change Project of the Lewis Mumford Center, 
families with income 175% of the poverty line and below are poor; families with income above 
350% of poverty line are rich; and families with income above 175% poverty line but less than 
350% poverty line are classified as middle income. Nominal income is used to calculate this 
index. Income categories are listed in table 1. 
Table 1: income categories for the definition of poor and rich families 
time poverty line poor middle rich 
1980 $7450 <=$13,037 $13,037-$26,075 >=$26,075 
1990 $12700 $22,500 $22,500 - $45,000 $45,000 
2000 $17050 $30,000 $30,000 - $60,000 $60,000 
Data sources: Lewis Mumford Center and U.S. Social Security Administration   
     Skills dissimilarity index is defined as: 
L
L
H
H
KDI ii
i
−= ∑2
1
 where  
Hi   indicate high-skill labor in tract i,  H is the total high-skill labor of an MA. Li indicate low-
skills on tract i and L are the total low-skills of an MA. High skills and low skills are defined by 
census occupation25. 
     According to the occupation category in the Census, if a person is working in a managerial, 
executive, administrative, professional specialty, technicians or related occupations, he/she is 
                                                 
24 This study tested the dissimilarity index between rich and middle income, and between middle income 
and poor. They do not have significant contributions to the model. 
25 This dissertation uses occupation instead of education because this index based on education is highly 
correlated with the education variables using as human capital index.  
                                                            
 
55
defined as high-skill labor. Sales persons, machine operators, assemblers and inspectors, handlers, 
equipment cleaners, helpers, laborer, and workers in transportation and material moving 
occupations are classified as low-skill labors26.  These data are from Census CD file SF3 in 1980, 
1990 and 200027.  
Student Segregation 
Student segregation28 is measured by the student racial dissimilarity index between white and 
black students, and the student income dissimilarity index between rich kids and poor kids. So 
student racial dissimilarity index is:
SB
SB
SW
SW
SRDI ii
i
−= ∑2
1
  where 
SWi  is the number of white students in school i and SW  is the total number of white students of an 
MA. SBi is the number of black students in school i and SB is the total number of black students 
of an MA. The student income dissimilarity index is:  
SP
SP
SR
SR
SIDI ii
i
−= ∑2
1
  where  
SRi   is the number of rich students in school i and SR is the total number of rich students of an 
MA. SPi is the number of poor students in school i and SP is the total number of poor students of 
an MA. Data for student dissimilarity indices in 1990 and 2000 are directly extracted from the 
Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change Project of Lewis Mumford Center. Data are not available 
in 1980 to calculate these indices29.  
Central-city and Suburb Disparity 
     Ratio of income of central cities to suburbs is used to measure the income disparity between 
the central city and its suburbs. The Census defines the largest place as the central city of an 
                                                 
26 The census occupation categories in 2000 are slightly different from those in 1990 and 1980. While high-
skill labor has the same definition, low-skills are defined in 2000 as workers in Construction, extraction, 
and maintenance occupations and Production, transportation, and material moving occupations 
27 I extracted 2000 occupation data from Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB). Because this dataset 
uses 2000 tract boundary as the base to normalize the historical census data, 2000 data from NCDB is 
actually the same as that from census CD 2000. 
28 Student in this index is defined as students in elementary school. 
29 Information is from the Department of Education. 
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MA30. The central city is the major city of an MA. The largest central city, in some cases, up to 
two additional central cities are included in an MA title. There are also central cities not included 
in the MA title. Central cities do not change with the expansion of MAs from 1980 to 2000. There 
are 542 central cities in the decennial period of 1980, 1990 and 2000. The growth of MAs has 
created more suburbs due to the decentralized urban growth pattern. The number of suburbs is 
9363, 10351, and 11397 in 1980, 1990 and 2000 respectively31.  
     Yet the concept of central cities in applied research is not consistent as how it is defined by the 
Census. Some studies used the largest central city as the boundary of central city, such as the 
work of Hill and Brennan (2005), Madden (2003), Nathan and Adams (1989), Rusk (1994), and 
Savitch et al. (1992). Mumphrey and Akundi (1993) and Voith (1998) used counties containing 
central cities to indicate central city areas. Some other researchers, such as Cooke and Marchant 
(2006), create their measurement for central cities according to the age of properties. There are 
also studies that use the census definition of central cities, such as Mills (1990), the SOCDS 
project managed by HUD, and the Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change  project conducted 
jointly by the University of Albany, SUNY and the Brown University.  
     A further examination of these studies revealed that the Census definition of central cities is 
commonly used for large scaled studies (all MAs are included). While the studies using the 
largest cities for central cities have relatively small sample size32. In addition, some researchers 
indicate the largest central cities as the primary central cities (Hill and Brennan 2005). Thus, this 
project uses the Census definitions of central cities to create the index for central city-suburb 
disparity. However, because tract boundary data in 1980 and the city boundary data in 2000 are 
not publicly accessible, city boundary annexation is not considered in this index. That is, central 
                                                 
30 From 2006, principle cities are used to designate the largest city of an MA. Additional cities qualify if 
specified requirements are met concerning population size and employment. “Principle cities” replaced 
“central cities” as the previous defined term.  
31 Data is from SOCDS Census Data created by HUD. 
32 For example, the largest MAs 14, 22, 55 or 75 MAs were selected as the study sample.   
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city areas in 1980 might be smaller than those in 2000. It results in underestimation of this index 
in 1980 because cities prefer annexing fringe areas with good growth potentials. 
     Two indicators are created to measure the income disparity between central cities and their 
suburbs. They are: 
         the ratio of city to suburb median household income. Data in 1990 and 2000 are from the 
Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change of Lewis Mumford Center. This index for 1980 is 
calculated based on Census data from SF333.  
         poverty concentration or the ratio of the percentages of persons in poverty in central cities to 
those of their suburbs. Data in 1990 and 2000 is calculated based on the indices from the 
Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change of Lewis Mumford Center. This index for 1980 is 
calculated based on data from Census SF3.           
Institutions 
     There are a large variety of ways to measure metropolitan government structure and there is no 
agreement about their validity and precision. Identifying government units at the local level and 
regional level will help to create measurements for government fragmentation and integration. 
Developing good measurements is not the focus of this dissertation, thus this project chose five 
measurements of government structure: total number of governments per 10,000 population, 
general-purpose governments per 10,000 population, special districts per 10,000 population, 
school districts per 10,000 population, and special district dominance, which is calculated by the 
ratio of special district per 10,000 population to general-purpose government per 10,000 
population. The first four indices are traditional measurements for government fragmentation. 
The larger the numbers, the more decentralized the governance of an MA. Yet they are criticized 
for obscuring the fact that, depending on its service area, an additional government might 
integrate rather than fragment the metropolis. The last measurement indicates the degree to which 
                                                 
33 In 1980, the ratio of city to suburb of mean household income, instead of median household income was 
calculated because median household income of MA is hard to estimate. Therefore, this index is not 
comparable longitudinally to those in 1990 and 2000.  
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metropolitan areas rely on limited-purpose special districts for service provision. It measures the 
relative government integration or functional fragmentation as Foster (1993) argued. Data are 
from Census of Government. 
      Sengstock’s topology has been the most widely used approach to classify state annexation 
statue. It categorizes state annexation laws into five groups according to the final decision-making 
authority for annexation: municipal determinant, population determinant, legislative determinant, 
quasi-legislative determinant, and judicial determinant. This study creates five dummy variables 
to indicate each category.  
     Annexation statues are state laws. However, the analysis unit of this project is metropolitan 
areas. To identify the governing annexation laws of each metropolitan area, central cities of each 
metropolitan area were identified first. Annexation policy codes were then assigned based on the 
state of the central cities. Another dummy variable named different is created for the metropolises 
with multiple central cities of different states. State annexation policies data in 1990 are from 
Galloway and Landis (1986) and the data for 1980 and 2000 are from Palmer and Lindsey (2001).  
Income Inequality 
     The Gini coefficient, ratio of family income34 shares going to the top 20% and bottom 20% 
quintiles of MAs, and the poverty rate are three measurements of income inequality. The Gini 
coefficient is the most widely used aggregate measure of inequality for the whole population in 
an economy. It is defined as the ratio between the average difference between all possible pairs of 
incomes in the population and the total income of the economy (Cowell 1995). I used PRLN 04 
developed by Professor Nielsen at UNC Chapel Hill to calculate the Gini coefficient. PRLN 04 is 
a DOS program coded by Professor Nielsen to calculate the Gini coefficient of income inequality 
                                                 
34 Income of individuals, family and households is used as measurements of income. Households tend to 
share the common economic fate. Residents of are a household not necessarily related to the householder 
for their earnings to be considered as part of the household income, Thus household income become one of 
the widely accepted measures of income. However, household income masks the gains or decrease of the 
family or individual income as its size is not commonly considered. The distortion makes direct 
comparisons between quintiles impossible. For this matter, family income is used to measure income 
inequality.   
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from income distribution data giving the number of individuals in income categories with the top 
categories open, such as those published by the Census Bureau. The program estimates the Gini 
coefficient by reconstructing the continuous distribution of income underlying the empirical 
distribution35.  This project aggregates tract-level family income data to the MA level and then 
uses this program to estimate the Gini coefficient. County boundaries are used to keep MA 
boundaries consistent as defined in 1999. 
     By taking the family income category mid-point as the average family income, I calculated the 
ratio of family income of the top 20 quintile to the bottom 20% quintile based on Census SF3 
data. The poverty rate is the percentage of population in poverty of the total population of an MA, 
according to the data from Census SF3. Measurements of spatial income inequality are listed in 
table 3.1   
                                                 
35 For more detailed description of this program please refer to Professor Nielsen’s webpage: 
http://www.unc.edu/~nielsen/data/data.htm 
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3.2.3 Variables for Human Capital and Labor 
     Human capital is measured by the percentage of high school graduates of total labor force and 
percentage of population with college degrees of the entire labor force. Data are from the Census. 
     Labor is measured by annual population growth rate. The economic growth literature uses 
population to indicate labor. In the 2000 model, labor is measured by the annual population 
growth rate from 1995 to 2000. In the 1990 model, it is the annual growth rate from 1980 to 1990. 
The time period measuring the population growth rate is 1970 to 1980 in 1980 model.  
     According to the Census, Labor force consists of both employed and unemployed population 
with 16 years old or over. Labor base for each time period in this project is measured by the 
percentage of labor force of the entire population of a Metropolitan Area. 
3.2.4 Metropolitan Characteristics 
     Metropolitan size, race, ethnicity, industrial structure, political homogeneity, and regional 
dummies were incorporated into the estimation model as metropolitan characteristics. 
Metropolitan size is the square miles of MAs. Data are from Neighborhood Change Database. 
Race is measured by percent of black population and ethnicity is the percent of Hispanics. Data 
are from Census SF3. Percent of employment in manufacturing industries is the indicator for 
industrial structure36. Data are collected from Bureau of Economic Analysis. Political 
homogeneity is calculated by PH= repdem PP − *100 where Pdem is the percentage of population 
voting for democratic candidate in president election, and Prep is percentage of population voting 
for republican candidate. These Data are from David Leip (2003). Election data in 1976, 1988 
and 2000 were used to create this index. 
     This project includes New England (Northeast), the South and the West as the regional 
dummies to control regional effect.  Table 3.2 lists the variables 
 
                                                 
36 This study also used percent of employment in FIRE, professional, scientific and management industries 
as a measurement for post-industrial industries. But data of this variable is only available in 2000. 
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Table 3.2: Metropolitan Area Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.5 Instrumental Variables 
           In order to test the theories underlying the hypotheses, I include two sets of variables: 
variables testing the theoretical linkage between residential segregation and variables testing the 
agglomeration effect that ties cities and suburbs. They are the percent of black families without 
cars and population density of each MA respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables descriptions Data sources 
MA size Square Miles of each MA (10,000) NCDB 
 Total population of each MA  
Race and Ethnicity Percentage of blacks  Census Bureau 
 Percentage of Hispanics Census Bureau 
Industrial Structure Percentage of Employment in 
manufacturing industry  
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
Political Homogeneity PH= repdem PP − *100  
Pdem is the percentage of democratic party 
affiliation of the region’s delegation to the 
U.S. House of Representatives; 
Prep is percentage of republican party 
affiliation of the region’s delegation to the 
U.S. House of Representatives 
David Leip 2003  
 
Regions New England (Northeast), South, West, 
Midwest  
Census Bureau 
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3.3 Boundary Issues 
 
 
    Unlike the political entities of states and counties, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) draws the boundaries of Metropolitan Areas (MAs) according to population size for 
economic statistics reasons. The dynamics of population changes foresee the written fate of 
waving boundaries of MAs. Thus all applied research handling longitudinal data on MA level has 
to confront the constantly changing boundaries. This project is not an exception. Given counties 
change their boundaries in very rare cases, county boundaries are used to coordinate the 
expansions and shrinkage of MA boundaries. Ten PMSAs from Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, 
MA-NH-ME-CT CMSA and five PMSAs from New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
NY-NJ-CT-PA CMSA are excluded from this research. County boundaries cross PMSA 
boundaries in these fifteen PMSAs. In other words, multiple PMSAs share same set of counties in 
this case. Thus complicated boundary issues are created. Advanced Geographical Information 
Technology is needed to track the changes of these MAs’ boundaries and it is very time 
consuming. This project leaves this issue and excludes these fifteen PMSAs in the analyses at this 
stage37.  
      With population growth and urbanization from 1980 to 2005, existing cities have grown and 
new cities have emerged. Therefore, lines dividing city and suburban areas also need to be 
clarified to calculate variables measuring the disparity between the central city and suburbs. A 
report from HUD suggests that the number of central cities did not change from 1980 to 2000. 
Yet areas of central cities might change due to annexation process, especially in the Northeast 
region. Since data of city boundaries and the census tract boundaries in 1980 are not publicly 
                                                 
37 The ten PMSAs in Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT CMA are: Boston, MA-NH PMSA, 
Brockton, MA PMSA, Fitchburg-Leominster, MA PMSA, Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA, Lowell, MA-NH 
PMSA, Manchester, NH PMSA, Nashua, NH PMSA, New Bedford, MA PMSA, Portsmouth-Rochester, 
NH-ME PMSA, and Worcester, MA-CT PMSA. The Five PMSAs in New York-Nortern New Jersey-Long 
Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA CMSA are: Bridgeport, CT PMSA, Danbury, CT PMSA, New Haven-Meriden, CT 
PMSA, Stemford-Norwalk, CT PMSA,  and Waterbury, CT PMSA.. Their population is 2.8% of the 
population of all the metropolitan areas across the U.S.. 
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available, this project does not consider the city annexation process in creating the index for the 
central city and suburban income disparity. Thus this index in 1980 might be underestimated 
because areas annexed by cities usually have good growth potential.  
     The third boundary issue this project has confronted is at the census tract level. Boundaries of 
census tracts have been varying in each decennial survey year due to population growth. This 
project does not keep the tract-level boundary consistent in calculating the variables given census 
tracts are not the unit of analysis for this project. Furthermore, Galster (2007) compared 
segregation indices with the transformed tract boundaries by NCDB and the original census tract 
boundaries and did not find significant difference between these two sets of variables.  
     Yet given the fact that the U.S. was not fully tracted in 1980, this project evaluates the 
untracted areas of each MA in 1980. It turns out that around 10.8% of MA areas in 2000 were not 
tracted in 1980. Almost all MAs in 1980 contain un-tracted areas according to the boundary of 
2000. Especially for Kenosha, WI and Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI, they have more than 50% of 
area un-tracted in 1980. They are excluded from the analysis for this matter. 
      
                                                         
      
     
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
 
     This chapter reports the results from the analyses examining the impact of residential 
segregation, central city-suburban income disparity and government structure. The results provide 
initial evidence supporting the hypotheses. Section 4.1 describes the results from descriptive 
analysis to provide primary information about the distribution pattern of all the variables across 
the metropolitan areas and regions through three decades. Section 4.2 explains variable choices in 
the testing model, although different measurements were developed for each major concept. 
Section 4.3 shows the basic relationship among major variables measuring spatial income 
inequality and income growth. The correlation coefficient between racial segregation and income 
growth has been increasing over time. Section 4.4 presents the results from three OLS estimations 
based on decennials data and the results about the impact on the long-term economic growth 
measured by average annual growth of real personal income per capita in 1980-2005. Results 
suggest that racial segregation not only drags down the short-term economic growth in each 
testing decade, but also negatively impacts the long-term income growth in 25 years. Negative 
impact of income segregation has emerged in the 1990s and is robust in the model of 2000. 
Results from the model based on data in the 1990s create validity concerns for interpretation. 
Section 4.5 summarizes the results and posits that it is desirable to examine whether structural 
change occurred in the 1990s to enhance our understanding of the research questions.  
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4.1 Descriptive Evidence 
 
 
     This section reports the exploratory and descriptive assessment of distribution pattern of all the 
variables across all the Metropolitan Areas (MAs), across different regions and across different 
time periods.   
4.1.1 Descriptive Results across MAs    
     Table 4.1 presents trends of economic growth and spatial income inequality from 1980 to 2000 
(institutional variables are reported in Table 4.2). From 1980 to 2005, economic growth measured 
by annual growth rate of real personal income per capita has been slowing down. Whether this 
declining trend reflects the convergent nature of economic growth suggested by neo-classical 
economic growth literature is a valuable open question worthy a further exploration.   
     Racial segregation measured by the racial dissimilarity index has been declining continually 
through the three decades. It is consistent with the evidence of many studies of segregation. 
Literature on segregation has noted the continued average declines of Black-White segregation 
from 1980 to 2000 (Adelman 2004, Armor and Clark 1995, Charles 2003, Farley and Frey 1994, 
Fischer 2003, Iceland 2004).  
     The 1980s saw almost all American metropolitan areas experienced a rise in segregation of the 
rich from the poor, measured by either income dissimilarity index or skills dissimilarity index, 
though these changes were slightly offset by modest declines in segregation during the 1990s. It 
is consistent with the evidence provided by Massey and Fischer (2006), although they utilized 
different concepts of poor and affluent. This result is partially coincident with the argument that 
income inequality is positively associated with economic segregation.  
     Income inequality, measured by GINI coefficient, rose continually from 1980 to 2000. 
Research has well illustrated factors contributing the enlarging income gap. The post-1970 
economy generally produced a bi-polar society (Sassen 1991). New technologies have generated 
high paid jobs in high-technology and professional service industries as well as many low paid 
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jobs for routine services. Thus the economy of post-1970 has persistently increased the 
population of poor individuals and households (Bernhardt et al 2000). The results from this 
project show a decline in poverty rate from 1980 to 1990, and then it jumps again from 1990 to 
2000. Whether it is due to the data quality or it is a fact contrary to the literature is a question 
worthy further examination.  
     As literature widely suggested, income segregation is generated by income inequality and is 
associated with income inequality. Empirical evidence demonstrated that rising income inequality 
is associated with rising residential segregation by income (Mayer 2001, Watson 2006). Watson 
(2006) also found that income inequality actually generated residential segregation by income 
using data from 1970 to 2000. Results from this project are partially coincident with the argument 
that income inequality is positively associated with economic segregation. The rising income 
inequality and economic segregation in the 1980s imply a contribution of income inequality to 
income segregation. However, increasing income inequality and declining residential segregation 
by income in the 1990s opposes the finding of Watson (2006) and suggests further research to 
examine the relationship between these two phenomena. In addition, the fact that income 
segregation did not follow the trend of racial segregation also requires further study. 
     Income disparity between central cities and suburbs is measured by the percentage of median 
family income in central cities to that of the suburbs. As table 4.1 shows, family income of central 
families has been persistently dwindled within two decades compared with their peers in 
suburban areas. The income gap between these two areas has been enlarged from 1980 to 200038. 
Consequently, poverty has concentrated in central cities during the same period, as the central 
city distress literature posited.  
     The different changing patterns of indices of income disparity between central cities and 
suburbs and those of economic segregation implies that residential segregation of income and 
                                                 
38 The author used mean family income of central cities and suburbs to calculate the index in 1980. 
Although this index is not exactly the same as those in 1990 and 2000, it can reflect the trend very well. 
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central city-suburban income disparity are two distinct dimensions of the metropolitan social 
landscape. They are not just two categories of measurements for metropolitan economic 
segregation, as many literatures explained.  
     Racial segregation in schools declined in 1990s following the trend of racial segregation. 
However, school income segregation did not follow the trend of residential income segregation. It 
increased in 1990s, which associated with the trend in income inequality and central city and 
suburban income disparity39. It might reflect the strong preference of families’ school choice with 
different income levels.  
Table 4.1: Trends of residential segregation and economic growth from 1980 to 2000 
 
Variables 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
Annual growth rate of real personal income per 
capita 2.30 (1.00) 2.01(0.61) 0.788 (1.08) 
    
Racial Segregation    
Racial dissimilarity index 60.75(13.64) 55.90(13.64) 51.47(13.7) 
    
Income Segregation    
Income dissimilarity index 28.91(6.24) 35.43(6.44) 34.32(6.43) 
Skills dissimilarity index 22.36(5.00) 27.58(5.71) 22.26(4.82) 
    
School Segregation    
Student Racial Dissimilarity index -- 53.85(14.49) 53.477(14.51)
Student Income Dissimilarity index -- 35.19(11.79) 39.12(11.41) 
    
Central city-suburb disparity    
Percent of central-city income of suburbs 94.59(24.83) 82.46(16.78) 79.20(15.51) 
Poverty concentration -- 1.40(0.46) 1.45 (0.45) 
    
Income Inequality    
GINI 37.16(2.58) 39.45(2.88) 41.23(3.09) 
Poverty rate 11.19(3.98) 9.66(1.03) 12.28(4.25) 
Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses. 
 
     Table 4.2 presents the trends of metropolitan government structure and state annexation 
policies. From 1980 to 2000, general-purpose government and school districts per 10,000 people 
persistently declined, yet special districts at the same time were relatively stable with a slight 
increase. As a result, the total number of governments in MAs decreased. And the ratio of special 
districts to general-purpose governments, which measures relative regionalism, has been 
                                                 
39 Data needed to calculate school segregation in 1980 is not available. 
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increasing significantly. It means metropolitan areas have been growing with more and more 
special districts specialized in particular service. 
     State annexation policies have a significant impact on municipalities’ territory expansion. The 
literature has widely acknowledged the positive effect of liberal annexation policies on city 
growth. Yet results from frequency analyses show the most liberal annexation policy, Municipal 
Determination policy, grew in 1980s but had a profound decline in 1990s. The Popular 
Determination policy, however, have grew remarkably from 1980 to 2000. A detailed 
examination by region found that the growth pattern of these two kinds of policies is not regional 
growth driven. Answers to why the most liberal annexation policy stopped growing in 1990, and 
why Popular Determination policy has sustained the growing trend will enhance our 
understanding of the connection between state annexation policies and urban growth.  
     Legislative Determination policy has shrunk steadily from 1980 to 2000. It might reflect the 
pressure from urban growth to relax the constraints for city expansion. Judicial Determination, 
Quasi-Legislative Determination, and MAs with central cities in different states have been stable 
in these two decades.           
Table 4.2 Trends of metropolitan government structure and annexation policies 
 
Variables 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
Government Structure    
Total government/10,000 population 2.90(2.24) 2.78(2.21) 2.82(2.16) 
General-purpose government/10,000 population 1.26(1.34) 1.19(1.31) 1.06(1.24) 
Special districts/10,000 population 1.09(1.09) 1.09(1.15) 1.19(1.09) 
School districts/10,000 population 0.55(0.51) 0.49(0.45) 0.47(0.38) 
Ratio of special-purpose government to general 
government 1.53(2.14) 1.74(2.39) 2.52(4.41) 
State Annexation Policies    
 Municipal Determination (MD) 71(22.76%) 79 (25.08%) 60 (19.17%) 
 Popular Determination    (PD) 106(33.97%) 116 (36.83%) 140 (44.73%) 
 Judicial Determination     (JD) 29(9.29%) 32(10.16%) 28 (8.95%) 
 Quasi-legislative Determination (QL) 61(19.55%) 60 (19.05%) 63 (20.13%) 
 Legislative Determination  (LD) 24(7.69%) 11 (3.49%) 7(2.24%) 
 Annexation Policies with central cities cross 
states (Diff) 16 (5.13%) 13 (4.13%) 15 (4.79%) 
Note: Standard Deviations in parentheses for Government Structure variables 
          Percentage is in parentheses for State Annexation Policy variables. 
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     Table 4.3 reports the trends of labor, human capital and Metropolitan Area characteristic 
variables. Human capital measured by percent of population with at least a four year college 
degree has been growing significantly from 1980 to 2000. But the percent of general labor has 
been decreasing remarkably. In these two periods, population growth generally slowed down in 
metropolitan areas.  
     The average size of MAs has a slight decline, which is a surprise. On the other hand, MAs are 
more and more densely populated and politically more and more homogenous from 1980 to 2000. 
Urban population diversity measured by percent of black population has increased as literature 
suggested. Manufacturing industries dwindled across MAs with the economic structure 
transforming from a manufacturing economy to a post-industrial one during these two decades40.  
Table 4.3 Labor, human capital and MA characteristics 
 
Variables 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
Human Capital and Labor    
Percent of population with college + degree 16.69(5.65) 19.74(6.34) 23.47(7.27) 
Percent of labor among total population 65.41(5.66) 65.00(4.96) 49.72(6.07) 
Annual growth rate of population 1.69(1.49) 1.06(1.28) 1.04(1.01) 
MA characteristics    
Area ( square miles) 
2266.11 
(3261.65) 
2168.50 
(2929.13) 
2221.04 
(3261.60) 
Population density 330 (852.16) 362 (847.65) 419 (941.06) 
Percent of black 9.91(10.02) 10.26(10.20) 10.83(10.71) 
Political homogeneity 11.60(9.45) 17.05(12.08) 20.84(14.35) 
Percent of manufacturing employment 17.90(9.07) 14.33(7.18) 13.97(6.55) 
Note: Standard Deviations are in the parentheses. 
 
4.1.2 Descriptive Results by Region 
 
     Table 4.4 presents the trends of economic growth and residential segregation across four 
regions. Results from this table confirm the descriptive evidence across the MAs.  Economic 
growth rates have been slowing from 1980 to 2005 in all four regions. Racial segregation 
declined in each region. Income segregation increased in 1980s and decreased in 1990. Income 
                                                 
40 Unfortunately, data is not available in census 1990 and 1980 to measure the growth of high-tech. 
industries. 
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disparity between central cities and the suburban areas has been enlarging. Income inequality has 
been rising and population under poverty line has been growing.  
    Yet these variables do perform regional variance. From 1980 to 1989, the Northeast had the 
fastest growth rate (3.13), South and Midwest followed with paralleled rates (2.43 and 2.11), the 
West was left far behind with a growth rate of 1.68.  
     The decade of 1990s saw the Midwest and the South as the leading regions driving income 
growth with growth rates of 2.25 and 2.00 percent. The West was catching up. Its income growth 
rate was 1.93 percent. The Northeast region quickly fell behind as the region with the least 
growth. The regional growth pattern in the 1990s partially reflected the economic structure 
change that occurred in the late 1990s. The flourishing internet and high-tech industry in the West 
explained the sustained and perpetuated growing trend. The fast growing rates in the Midwest and 
the South region might reflect the prosperous new industries and the traditional manufacturing 
industry (especially the auto industry in the Midwest region). The Northeast is the only region 
with slower income growth in the 1990s and it is the only region with a declining growth trend 
from 1980 to 2005. All other three regions experienced a relatively fast growing period in 1990s 
compared with 1980s. Reasons for the dwindling income growth rate in Northeast need to be 
gauged to restore this area.  
     The time from 2000 to 2005 was marked by the surging states in the South and West. 
Compared with the Midwest and Northeast, these two regions maintained good income growth 
with the leading effect of booming high-tech and service oriented industries. The Midwest region 
dropped from the top to the bottom, following the fate of the Northeast. The shrinking traditional 
manufacturing industries and the slugging auto industry might mainly contribute the decay of the 
Midwest in 2000. Figure 4.1 shows the income growth trend across three periods. 
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Figure 4.1 Income growth in 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2005 
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     In the three time periods, racial segregation in the Northeast region has declined moderately, 
but it maintained as the most segregated area. The West has been the least segregated by race and 
racial segregation declined sharply during 1980s and 1990s.  Income segregation does not show a 
remarkable regional variance. The Northeast has slightly lower income segregation than the other 
three regions. Yet it has higher income segregation in schools. Racially, schools in the Northeast 
and Midwest were more segregated than those in the South and West.  
     Income disparity between central city and suburban areas is lower in the South and the West, 
than that in the Northeast and Midwest. Income is distributed most equally in the Midwest and 
the South has the higher income inequality. Associated with income equality, the Midwest has the 
lowest poverty rate, while the poverty rate in the South and West are relatively higher, especially 
in 2000. It might reflect theories about post-industrial economies that produce higher income 
inequality and more population in poverty.  
     As shown in table 4.5, the number of total governments per 10,000 population and the number 
of general-purpose governments per 10,000 population have been declining through two decades 
and across four regions. The number of special districts has been increasing at the same time. As 
a result, the public service professionalism, or relatively regionalism has been increasing. Yet the 
regional variation of institutional fragmentation of MAs has been significant.  
     The Midwest has been the most fragmented region across two decades. It has the most 
governments per 10,000 population, and the most general-purpose governments per 10,000 
population. It might because the general-purpose governments provide most of public services 
that the number of special district is not comparable. As a result, the Midwest contains the lowest 
ratio of special districts to general-purpose governments. The Northeast follows the Midwest as a 
fragmented region. Its number of general-purpose governments is relatively high, thus the role of 
special districts is not as remarkable as the South and the West. 
     Institutionally, the West is not as integrated as the South. Its total number of governments per 
10,000 is much higher than in the South. Yet it has the least general-purpose governments and the 
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most special districts per 10,000, which make it the area with most of its public services provided 
at a regional-wide scale. The South is the least fragmented region with the lowest number of total 
governments per 10,000 population. The growth in the general-purpose governments and special 
districts are parallel. Yet the role of special districts in public service provision is significant 
compared with the Midwest and the Northeast. 
     Regional variation of state annexation policies is extraordinary. The South has been the most 
liberal region for annexation. Most central cities of MAs in the South have Municipal 
Determination policies and Popular Determination policies. It makes it easier for southern cities 
to expand their territories through annexation. The West is the most conservative region with 
most cities having Quasi-Legislative Determination policies. Cities with this kind of policies have 
to go through much more complex procedures to annex.  
     Annexation policies in the Midwest are diverse and balanced in each category. It is hard to 
classify the Northeast as liberal or conservative. Most cities in the Northeast have Popular 
Determination policies, the relatively liberal annexation policy, or Legislative Determination 
policies, the most conservative policy. Yet states in the Northeast have moved toward the liberal 
direction in the 1990s because there are more cities with Popular Determination policies and 
fewer cities having Legislative Determination policies. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of 
Municipal Determination, Popular Determination, and Judicial Determination policies. 
     Table 4.6 shows that human capital has been increasing in all the regions from 1980 to 2000, 
yet population in labor force have been declining. Population has been flowing to the West and 
South through two decades. Thus these two regions maintain faster population growth and also 
more diverse ethnic composition. The black population has concentrated in the South, while the 
West maintained the favorable region for the Hispanic population. 
     Manufacturing industries have been declining across four regions. The Northeast and the 
Midwest contain more manufacturing industries compared with the South and West.  
     Politically MAs are moving toward homogeneity in all the regions. 
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Figure 4.2 Geographical distributions of annexation policies 
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4.2 Variable Selection 
 
 
     In order to describe a clearer and more precise profile of spatial income inequality of 
metropolitan areas, several indices for each concept were created. For example, the income 
dissimilarity index and skills dissimilarity index are measurements for income segregation; the 
ratio of household income in central cities of that in suburbs and poverty concentration are 
indices for income disparity of central cities and suburbs; and the GINI coefficient and poverty 
rate are measures for income inequality. Multicolinearity problems will appear if we incorporate 
all the variables in one testing model. Thus we need to choose one measurement for each concept.  
     The income dissimilarity index and skill dissimilarity index have same changing trends during 
1980-2000 and their correlation coefficient is .55, .66 and .60 in 1980, 1990 and 2000.  It means 
they are measurements for the same concept. I chose skill dissimilarity index for three reasons. 
First, it fits the theory linking economic segregation and economic growth better. Benabou (1993) 
states that economic segregation isolates low-skill labor from the high-skill labor, thus high-skill 
labor cannot attain adequate services from the low skills and ultimately the entire economy grows 
at a lower rate. Second, the income dissimilarity index is not an accurate measurement for the 
controversies about the line dividing rich and poor across the country. And third, the income 
dissimilarity index does not perform well in the testing model. 
      The correlation coefficients between percent of central-city household income to suburban 
household income and poverty concentration are .74 and .72 in 1990 and 2000. The former index 
is a direct measurement for the central city-suburban disparity, and poverty concentration is not 
developed because of data availability problems. Thus percent of central-city family income to 
suburban family income is the variable in the testing model. 
     The GINI coefficient and poverty rate are created to measure income inequality. Their 
correlation coefficient is .70, .19, and .49 in 1980, 1990 and 2000. GINI coefficient is the 
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standard index for income inequality and it is more widely used. So the GINI coefficient is 
incorporated in the testing model41. 
4.3 Correlations 
 
 
     The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of spatial income inequality on 
economic growth. This section presents correlation coefficients of economic growth and spatial 
income inequality. As mentioned above, spatial income inequality is measured as racial 
segregation, income segregation, the disparity between central cities and their suburbs, and 
government fragmentation on MAs. The correlations provide a preliminary picture of the 
relationship between economic growth and variables measuring spatial income inequality, and the 
connections among the spatial inequality variables. Table 4.7, table 4.8, and table 4.9 show the 
correlation coefficients of these variables in 1980, 1990 and 2000 respectively.  
     The tables reveal that economic growth is not correlated with spatial income inequality 
substantially. All the correlation coefficients with economic growth are low, yet the numbers 
have gotten larger with time, especially in 2000. The coefficients for racial segregation, school 
segregation by both race and income, and the disparity between central cities and suburban areas 
are moderate. In addition, the correlation coefficient between economic growth and racial 
segregation has been growing through two decades consistently, especially in 2000, the sign of 
correlation coefficients follows the hypothesized direction and the value is much higher than its 
peers in 1980 and in 1990. And thirdly, racial segregation highly correlates with school 
segregation by race in 2000. It also correlates with school segregation income and central city-
suburban income disparity in 1990 and 2000, although the correlation coefficients are moderate. 
    The income dissimilarity index and skills dissimilarity index, both measuring income 
segregation, are highly correlated as we mentioned in last section. The correlation tables convey 
                                                 
41 I actually tested all the variables in the model, income dissimilarity index, poverty concentration and 
poverty rate in the testing model. They did produce multicollinearity problems and did not improve the 
model performance. 
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the consistent relationship between these two measurements across time periods. In these three 
tables, neither of the two variables measuring income segregation substantially correlates with 
racial segregation, which counters the conventional wisdom. It implies that racial segregation and 
income segregation are two separate social dimensions instead of a single one as many studies 
suggested. Furthermore, skills dissimilarity index is highly correlated with schools segregation by 
income and income inequality. It means income segregation, school segregation by income and 
income inequality are closely related or intertwined. 
     Racial segregation and income segregation in school are correlated with each other. They also 
correlate with central city-suburban areas income disparity.  
     Gini coefficient and poverty rate are highly correlated in 1980. Their relationship is weak in 
1990 and the correlation coefficient between these two variables becomes modest in 2000.  
     Although correlation analyses only provide exploratory evidence for the connections among 
the main variables of this project, the results suggest hints on their possible relationship. The 
consistent pattern of the correlation coefficients across three time points, their unique 
performance in different time period, and their signs and values in 2000 demand further analyses 
to determine the true relationship between these two important urban phenomena across the U.S. 
MAs.  
Table 4.7: Correlations among economic growth and segregation variables 1980 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Economic growth 1         
(2) Racial segregation .044 1        
(3) Income segregation .082 .125 1       
(4) Skills segregation .149 .251 .549 1      
(5) Centralcity-suburban 
income disparity -.076 -.139 -.118 -.163 1     
(6) Income inequality .000 -.007 .556 .231 .119 1    
(7) Poverty rate .073 -.129 .337 .337 .028 .704 1   
(8) Total government/10,000 
population -.171 -.220 -.421 -.299 -.098 -.368 -.251 1  
(9) Ratio of special 
districts/general-purpose  
government 
-.253 -.258 -.055 -.207 -.069 .181 -.004 .176 1 
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4.4 Evidence from Regression Analyses 
 
 
      In order to examine the effects of spatial income inequality on metropolitan economic 
growth, three OLS regression analyses were conducted to test the effect of these variables on 
economic growth per decade. Dependent variables are the annual average growth rate of real 
personal income per capita from 1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2005. To identify the 
long-term effect of spatial income inequality variables, a set of OLS regression estimations was 
conducted on the long-term economic growth measured by the annual average growth rate of real 
personal income per capita from 1980 to 2005. This chapter will report results from OLS 
estimations through ten-year periods, then results about the effects across twenty five years will 
be described. All results will be summarized at the end which will help to draw the conclusions. 
4.4.1 Economic Effects of Spatial Income Inequality per Decade      
     This section presents the results from three sets of OLS estimation across ten years. Because 
data in 2000 is in the best shape, I report the results based on data in 2000 first, followed results 
in 1990 presented in table 4.11; and results from 1980 are shown in table 4.12 and discussed last. 
Model one tests the effects of residential segregation variables on economic growth. Model two 
identifies the economic effects of income disparity between central cities and their suburbs. 
Model three studies the effects of government structure of state annexation policies. Model four 
tests school segregation variables42, model five is about income inequality and model six is the 
full model including all major independent variables.  
Results from data in 2000 
     Table 4.10 contains all the results from six models based on data in 2000. Most of the results 
support the theoretical hypotheses developed in Chapter two very well. Model one shows both 
racial segregation and skills segregation in 2000 have a significantly negative effect on  
                                                 
42 Because data are not available to develop the measurements for school segregation in 1980, model four is 
only available in the analyses of 1990 and 2000. 
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metropolitan economic growth from 2000 to 2005. One unit of increase in racial segregation in 
2000 is associated with 2.7% of decrease in economic growth rate in 2000-2005. And one unit of 
increase in skills segregation in 2000 slows down metropolitan economic growth rate in 2000-
2005 by 2.7%. It means that if black and white population, high-skill and low-skill labor of a 
metropolitan area are segregated into different residential communities, the personal income 
growth rate of this metropolitan area will be lower.  
     The log value of the variable testing the spatial hypothesis mismatch, percent of black family 
without a car, is significantly negative. It posits that by living in segregated poor communities, 
black families, as the main low-skill labor sources, without a car have difficulties accessing 
employment opportunities which will finally slow down the real personal income growth. The 
significance of this variable reveals that complementary-effect between high-skill and low-skill 
labor and the spatial mismatch hypothesis combine together to provide the theoretical rationale 
that residential segregation decreases metropolitan economic growth. This result makes this study 
very interesting because it provides strong support for the theoretical hypotheses that integrates 
the complementary-effect perspective and spatial mismatch hypothesis.  
     Model two tests the effects of the income disparity between central cities and their suburbs 
economic growth across MAs. It reveals that a larger income gap between these two urban areas 
is associated with slower subsequent metropolitan economic growth. And the more poverty 
concentrates in the urban center, the slower the MA grows. It means that if income is distributed 
unequally among the population of a metropolitan area, the economic growth rate is lower than 
the areas with more equal income distributions. The results support the theoretical hypothesis 
very well, yet it does not inherently support the agglomeration effect which directly develops the 
hypothesis. Population density tests the agglomeration effect and does not significantly explain 
the variance of metropolitan growth in 2000-2005. However, the percent of black families 
without a car is negatively significant. It indicates that the linkage of the economies of central 
cities and their suburbs might be through the spatially mismatched urban labor market, instead of 
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agglomeration effect. In other words, central city-suburb income disparity and the MA economic 
performance might be tied by urban labor market, instead of knowledge spillover effect. Yet this 
argument desires further research, probably through better indicator to test the agglomeration 
effect, to a robust conclusion.  
     Model three is a test of government structure and state annexation polices. The total number of 
governments including general-purpose government, special districts and school districts per 
10,000 population has a positive effect43. As a traditional indicator for government fragmentation, 
this result contradicts the conventional wisdom. Yet given general-purpose governments and 
school districts have been declining through 1980 to 2000, and there are more special districts 
compared with general-purpose governments, the positive sign might reflect the positive effect of 
special districts on metropolitan growth rather than the effect of local government fragmentation. 
The positive sign of the ratio of special districts to general-purpose governments provides 
supportive evidence for this interpretation. Yet whether the positive sign of the ratio of special 
districts to general-purpose governments signals the positive effect of governmental regionalism, 
or the effect of functional fragmentation is an open question in urban governance research.  
     State annexation policies measured by Municipal Determination policy (MD), Popular 
Determination policy (PD), Judicial Determination policy (JD), Quasi-Legislative determination 
policy (QL) and Legislative determination policy (LD) following Sengstock’s topology were all 
tested. This model focuses on MD and PD for two reasons: one, they are the most liberal policies 
suggested by the literature for positive effects on growth; two, to simplify the model. 
Surprisingly, neither of these two policies has significant effect. Previous research has widely 
acknowledged the effects of state annexation policies on state-level annexation activities and state 
population growth. Yet their effects are not maintained when tested on economic growth on the 
metropolitan level.  
                                                 
43 Number of general-purpose governments/10,000 population, number of special districts/10,000 
population, and number of school districts/10,000 were tested and none of them contribute the model 
significantly.  
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     Model four contains school segregation variables by race and income. Their hypothesized 
negative signs were confirmed in this model and the percent of black families without a car is 
negative and significant. As the results from model one, results from model four strongly support 
the theories documented in Chapter Two. 
     Model five works on income inequality. The GINI coefficient is negative as hypothesized, yet 
the poverty rate has a positive sign. It yields a problem to interpret the contrasted results. 
Probably the negative GINI coefficient reveals the negative effect of income inequality broadly 
argued and examined by researchers. Yet the poverty rate might be an indicator for low-skilled 
population in the low-paid occupations. The positive sign on the poverty rate might reflect the 
complementary effect of the low-skill labor to the high-skill labor, given the 21st century 
economy is service-oriented, and poverty rates increase with technology development and with 
the income increase of the upper middle classes, this interpretation might be reasonable.  
     44Model six includes all the variables from each model and tests the robustness of the results. 
It shows most results from each model are kept in Model six. That is, the negative effect of racial 
segregation, income segregation, central city-suburban income disparity, income inequality, 
percent of black families with a car, and the positive sign of the ratio of special districts to 
general-purpose government were the same. Annexation policies maintain their silent role in 
explaining metropolitan economic growth. Yet the power of income inequality waned in the 
model with segregation variable. It might convey the following ideas. First, income inequality 
and spatial income inequality composed of residential segregation, central city-suburban income 
disparity and government fragmentation are intertwined as suggested in Chapter two. Second, 
spatial income inequality has a stronger power in explaining economic growth across the 
metropolitan areas in the US than income inequality.  
     The effects of human capital and labor are consistent across the testing models. Human capital 
measured by percent of population with four-year college education in 2000 positively 
                                                 
44 Because of multicollinearity problem, school segregation variables are not included. 
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contributes metropolitan economic growth in 2000-2005. Yet the percent of population in the 
labor force in 2000 and the average annual growth rate of population from 1995 to 2000 have 
negative signs. The traditional view of economic growth attributes labor and population growth as 
important factors for driving economic growth. The negative signs of these two variables raise 
questions to explain their roles. Given the immigration trend since late 1990s, might the 
population growth rate and the percent of population in labor force reflect the flushing-in 
immigrants?  
      Of the metropolitan characteristics, percent of employment in manufacturing industries 2000 
show a negative effect on economic growth in 2000-2005. It means an MA relying more on 
manufacturing industries associates with lower economic growth rate. Larger MAs perform 
better. Given the regional growth pattern, compared to the South, Northeast, Midwest and West 
grow more slowly. Demographic diversity, measured by percent of Black and percent of 
Hispanic, does not claim a role in explaining economic growth in this period. Political 
homogeneity is not significant either.  
 Results from data in 1990 
     Results of OLS estimation on average annual growth rate of real personal income per capital 
from 1990 to 1999 are presented in table 4.11. Generally speaking, the results provide puzzles 
rather than answers to the research questions. First of all, the exactly same testing model does not 
explain the dependent variable in 1990-1999 well. Compare the values of F and R square with 
those from the models based on data in 2000, the difference is obvious. Second, most primary 
independent variables are not significant, or not in the hypothesized direction. Third, no MA 
characteristics variables significantly contribute the models. 
     In model one, neither racial segregation nor income segregation is significant. In addition, 
percent of black families without a car which tests the spatial mismatch hypothesis is surprisingly  
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positive, contradicting the hypothesis and the traditional wisdom. Results from model four testing 
school segregation are the same. School segregation variables are not significant, although 
percent of black families without a car is not significant either. No variables are significant in 
model five testing income inequality. 
     The percentage of household income in central cities to their suburbs and the poverty 
concentration in central cities, the measures for the income disparity between central cities and 
suburbs, are significant in model two. Yet the sign of the former variable is in the wrong 
direction. It indicates that larger central city-suburban income disparity of an MA associates with 
faster economic growth. And again, percent of black families without a car is positive. 
     Percent of special districts to general-purpose government is negative in model three testing 
government structure and state annexation policies. Again, no state annexation policy variables 
are significant.  
     In the full model, racial segregation is not significant. Skills segregation surprisingly turns to 
be negatively significant. It is the result from the suppression effect of GINI coefficient. Without 
the GINI coefficient, it is not significant. Income disparity between central cities and their 
suburbs are positive. Percent of black families without a car maintains positive. 
     Human capital is consistently positive across the models. It seems human capital plays a 
stronger role in the models of 1990 than it does in 2000. The percent of labor force in the 
population 16 years older positively contributes to economic growth from 1990 to 1999. 
Population growth does not have a significant role though.  
     No MA variables significantly explain the variance of the personal income growth during 
1990-1999.  
     It is very hard to interpret the results from the OLS estimation based on data in 1990s, since 
the model does not fit the data well. Why should larger income disparity between central cities 
and suburbs be associated with higher personal income growth across metropolitan areas? Why 
the variable, percent of black families without a car, which is an indicator for spatial mismatch 
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hypothesis and have a good reason to be negative, consistently shows a positive sign? Why, 
compared with more general-purpose governments, should more special districts in 1990 slow 
down metropolitan economic growth during 1990-1999? I have to leave these questions open at 
this stage in this project. 
Results from data in 1980        
     Table 4.12 contains the results from OLS regressions on the average annual growth rate of real 
personal income per capital from 1980 to 1989. As the results from the data in 2000, racial 
segregation is significantly negative, which means an MA with higher racial segregation in 1980 
is associated with slower economic growth during 1980-1989. Income segregation is not 
substantial in 1980, thus its effect has not showed up yet. Central cities dominate urban growth in 
1980s. Suburbanization has not been the prominent urban growth pattern and urban areas have 
not have been divided artificially as the consequences of high-tech development. Thus the income 
disparity between central cities and suburbs are not significant in model two. It is a pity that data 
are not available to test the role of percent of black families without a car for the spatial mismatch 
hypothesis. Yet population density plays a significant role in this period. It posits the role of 
agglomeration effect or knowledge spillover effects when a city grows as suggested in Chapter 
two.        
     The total number of governments per 10,000 population is significantly negative in model 
three. Because it is a conventional measurement for government fragmentation, it supports the 
argument that municipal competition is a zero-sum game and thus government fragmentation is 
associated with slower economic growth. The ratio of special districts to general-purpose 
government is not significant. This might be rooted in the fact that special districts were not 
predominantly more than the general-purpose governments in the 1980s.  
     Contrary to the hypothesis, municipal determination (MD) annexation policy negatively 
affects metropolitan economic growth in 1980. This result might help to explain the diminishing 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
96
MD annexation policies from 1980 to 2000. Yet it desires more research to gauge the 
interpretation of its negative sign.  
     Income inequality performs a positive sign in model five, which is consistent with the results 
from Bhatta (2001).  
     All the results held in the full model, which means they are robust. The negative role of racial 
segregation, the negative sign of total number of governments per 10,000 population, the negative 
sign of MD annexation policy, and the positive effect of population density are maintained in the 
full model. Income inequality loses its role in the model together with the spatial income 
inequality variables, which is the same with the results based on data in 2000. The consistent 
results across different time period might reveal the fact that spatial income inequality has a 
stronger power to explain metropolitan economic growth than income inequality.  
     Human capital and population growth claimed their significant roles for metropolitan 
economic growth, which confirmed the traditional view of economic growth. 
     Of the MA characteristics, manufacturing industries in 1980 contributes metropolitan 
economic growth significantly. It indicates manufacturing industries were the driving force for 
economic growth, although it became a burden in the first decade of the 21st century. The percent 
of black population has a significant positive sign, yet percent of Hispanics shows a negative 
effect. How to explain these variables with conflicting signs is worthy of more studies for insight. 
Political homogeneity shows its role in 1980s. The higher value of this variable, the more 
homogeneous is a MA. The negative sign implies that party competition is good for metropolitan 
growth in 1980s.       
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4.4.2 Summery of OLS Estimations from data in 1980, 1990 and 2000    
     Table 4.13 summarizes the signs of major variables from three OLS estimations. It portrays 
basic attributes of these variables in explaining metropolitan economic growth in three decades. 
Yet we need to be cautious when we map the trend of the signs from 1980 to 2000.  As it shows 
in table 4.11, the testing model does not fit the data in 1990s well. It provides the possibility that 
testing models that fit the data very well might produce different signs on the variables. Thus 
there is a good chance to question the validity of the results from the OLS estimation based on 
data in 1990s. But still, results from these three OLS estimations, especially the good model 
performance from data in 1980 and 2000, shed light on a better understanding of the connection 
between the geographical distribution of socioeconomic attributes of the population and the 
macroeconomic growth across the metropolitan areas in the U.S.  
Table 4.13 Impacts of major variables from three OLS estimations 
    
Variables 
 
1980
 
1990
 
2000 
 
Trend 
Racial segregation -- ns -- Negative  
Skills segregation ns -- -- Emerging Negative 
     
Income disparity of central cities and suburbs ns + -- Inconsistent 
     
Total government/10,000 population -- ns + positive trend  
Ratio of special districts/general-purpose government ns ns + Emerging positive 
Municipal Determination policy (MD) -- ns ns Diminished effect 
Popular Determination policy (PD) ns ns ns No effect 
     
GINI coefficient + ns -- Negative trend 
     
Percent of Black Families without cars na + -- Inconsistent  
Population Density + ns ns Diminished effect 
Percent of College+ education + + + Consistently positive
Percent of Labor + ns -- Negative trend 
Average population growth rate + ns -- Negative trend 
     
Percent of employment in Manufacturing + ns -- Negative trend 
 
     Racial segregation maintains a negative sign in models of both 1980 and 2000. Although it is 
not significant in 1990, the results provides strong signal for the negative effect of racial 
segregation on economic growth. The negative sign of skills segregation is in the model of 1990 
and 2000. Skills segregation or income segregation was low in 1980s. It might be the reason for 
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the insignificance of this variable. Although its negative effect is highlighted under the 
suppression effect of GINI coefficient in 1990, the negative effect emerged. In 2000, the negative 
effect of skills segregation is robustly significant. Thus with skills segregation rising to a certain 
level, it will slow down the subsequent economic growth.  
     The performance of the income disparity between central cities and suburbs is tough to 
interpret. It is obvious that central cities dominate urban growth in 1980s and they are the real 
urban cores. With the income gap between these two areas enlarging, its negative impact turns 
significant in 2000s. The negative sign of percent of black families without a car provides 
evidence to form the story that spatial mismatch is the mechanism through which income 
disparity drives down the economic growth. Yet the positive signs of this variable and the percent 
of black families with a car in 1990 present a hard question. The suburbanization progress was 
triggered by the internet and telecommunication technology development from mid-1990s. Thus 
the positive sign of the income disparity between central cities and their suburbs might reflect the 
development of high-tech industries. Yet the positive sign of the percent of black families without 
a car questions the plausibility of this story about high-tech development. Again, this project has 
to leave it as an open question for further exploration. 
     The effect of the number of total governments per 10,000 population turns from negative 
supported by the traditional view, to positive. As I elaborated in the last section, the negative sign 
confirms the argument that over-competition among municipals is a zero-sum game and a waste 
of public resources. Thus government fragmentation has a negative impact on metropolitan 
economic growth. However, this index might represent the rapidly growing number of special 
districts in 2000. Since special districts can provide public services region wide, externalities are 
internalized and economies of scale is exploited. Thus special districts are beneficial to economic 
growth especially in a service-oriented economy, when the demand of professional service 
provision is substantially raised by the public. The positive sign of the ratio of special districts to 
general-purpose governments supports this interpretation. 
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     The negative sign of municipal determination annexation policy in 1980 contradicts the 
conventional wisdom. There is a consensus in the literature that liberal annexation policy 
increases municipal annexation activities and also urban growth. The results show that empirical 
results about annexation policies across the states might not hold for metropolitan-level analyses. 
Yet this result provides insights for us to understand the diminishing number of metropolitan 
areas with this type of annexation policy. Compared with the shrinking trend of municipal 
determination annexation policy, popular determination annexation policy has expanded across 
the metropolitan areas substantially. Yet it does not contribute to income growth significantly in 
the models of 1990 and 2000. If economic growth was not the consequence for the expansion of 
popular determination policy, is it the cause? Or other concerns dominated the policy-making 
process in this case? 
      Human capital has been contributing to economic growth consistently and substantially, as 
suggested by the traditional view of economic growth. Yet the percent of population in labor 
force, average annual growth rate of population, and percent of employment in manufacturing 
industries have changed from positive to negative through two decades. The deteriorating 
manufacturing industries indicate that the economic structure transformed from a manufacturing 
economy in 1980 to a service-oriented arena in 2000. With the booming of high-tech and 
professional service industries, human capital nurtured by higher education is more important to 
the economy than the general labor. Labor with lower education is important in the economy 
where manufacturing industry plays a large role. In an economy that highly relies on human 
capital and a large part of low-skills have difficulties to access their jobs, the large labor force 
might add service costs to the society through re-distributive policies. Thus the signs of labor and 
population growth can be negative. This explanation hints that providing channels for the poor to 
be employed might be really beneficial to macroeconomic performance. 
     In sum, these three OLS estimations provide evidence about the negative effect of racial 
segregation and skills segregation, although it desires more study to strengthen the robustness of 
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the results. The OLS estimations also provide insights for us to understand metropolitan 
economic growth. Yet these analyses only test the effects on decennial economic performance, 
which is a relatively short time. How about the effects of the variables on the long-term economic 
growth, say, from 1980 to 2005? Evidence about the long-term effects might enhance our 
understanding about the metropolitan growth. The following section reports the effects of spatial 
income inequality in 1980 on the metropolitan economic growth in 25 years. 
4.4.3 Long-term Economic Effects of Spatial Income Inequality  
     Table 4.14 shows the effects of spatial income inequality on economic growth in 1980-2005 
from the OLS estimation. Racial segregation in 1980 negatively impacted metropolitan economic 
growth in the following 25 years. Skills segregation and the central city-suburban income 
disparity do not show their destructive effects. That might because in the 1980s, urban areas were 
not divided into two isolated societies, and were not segregated by income or skills yet, although 
residential communities were symbolized strongly by race.  
     The performance of the institutional variables is a little surprising. The ratio of special districts 
to general-purpose government in 2000 positively contributes economic growth from 2000 to 
2005. It does not explain the income growth in 1990s and in 1980s. Yet results from model three 
convey to us the message that government structure might have a long-term effect. And although 
it helps increase income growth in a short time, it might negatively impact economic growth in a 
long run.  
     And both of the state annexation policies, municipal determination policy and popular 
determination policy show their negative signs too, although their explanatory power does not 
show up in the decade-long models.  
     Income inequality measured by the GINI coefficient seems insignificant for the long-term 
economic growth, yet the poverty rate has a positive sign.  
     Human capital not only contributes short-term income growth consistently, it contributes the 
long-term economic growth too, which is consistent with the traditional wisdom of economists. 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
103
Population growth rate also increases income growth although it might slow down economic 
growth in a short time, such as from 2000 to 2005.  
     Manufacturing industries does not affect 25-year income growth at all. Percent of black 
population show a positive sign and percent of Hispanics show a negative sign. 
     Although it is controversy to interpret all the OLS estimation results about the effect on 25-
year economic growth, the results convey the information that racial segregation not only deters 
short-term economic growth, but also hinders long-term economic growth across metropolitan 
areas. The insignificance of skills segregation and central city-suburban income disparity cannot 
be taken as that they are not harmful. Their deleterious effects might not show up yet since in 
1980s, residential segregation by income and city decay is not substantial. The negative sign of 
skills segregation the model of 1990s and 2000s implies it is destructive effect on urban growth. 
Thus policies should provide incentives for building more integrated residential communities 
both by race and by income. 
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4.5 Summary and Discussion 
 
 
     Results from the analyses show that the MA economic growth rate has been declining through 
these two and half decades. The economic growth center moved from the Northeast to the 
Midwest and then the South and the West. At the same time, the metropolitan communities are 
more integrated by race, but more segregated by income. As for metropolitan governance, special 
districts which focus on region-wide service provision have grown substantially, while the 
proportion of traditional general-purpose governments has declined. 
     Three OLS estimations based on decennial data show metropolitan areas more segregated by 
race are associated with slower economic growth measured by the average annual growth rate of 
real personal income per capita. The negative impact of income segregation has been emerging 
from 1990s with its rising trend. The results follow the theoretical hypotheses very well. In 
addition, the negative sign of percent of black families without a car supports the theory that 
connects residential segregation and economic growth together by combining spatial mismatch 
hypothesis and the complementary effects argument. Low-skill labor and high-skill labor are 
complementary inputs for production. If it is hard for poor minorities to access their jobs, the 
return to their education cannot compensate the costs. It will drag down the education 
investments from the poor, and ultimately the entire investments for human capital of the whole 
MA. As shown by the results and suggested by the traditional view of economists, human capital 
serves as the driving force for innovation and production; the reduction of education investments 
then slows down income growth. 
     The performance of the income disparity between central cities and their suburbs does not 
follow the hypothesis this well. Its negative sign from the model in 2000 follows the theoretical 
hypothesis. However, because percent of black families without a car is negative and population 
density is not significant, it indicates the negative impact of this variable on income growth might 
be through the spatially mismatched labor market instead of knowledge spillover effect. Since 
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population density might not be a good indicator of agglomeration effects, more research is 
desired to identify the underlying rationale. The positive signs of both the central city and 
suburban disparity and percent of black families without a car in 1990s create a puzzle for us. 
Since the testing model does not fit the data quite well in 1990s, this project leaves this task at 
this stage for more exploration. 
     The analyses also reveal metropolitan areas with more governments per 10,000 governments 
are associated with slower subsequent economic growth in 1980s. Yet with the growth of special 
districts, its sign turns positive. It might reflect the fact the special districts are more efficient for 
public service provision on the metropolitan areas because the economics of scale is take 
advantage. The positive sign on the ratio of special districts to the general-purpose governments 
supports the interpretation. 
     Although it is widely suggested by the literature that liberal annexation policies increase city 
annexation activities, this study does not find significant impact of annexation policies. It is hard 
to explain the diminishing trend of municipal determination policies and the substantial expansion 
of popular determination. One possibility is that liberal state annexation policies might affect 
state-level growth, but their effects are not that significant on metropolitan level.  
     Since the economy transformed from the manufacturing dominated structure to a service-
oriented arena during this period, the manufacturing industries turn from a major contributor in 
1980s to income growth to a burden of the metropolitan growth in 2000. At the same time, the 
signs on labor and population growth have the same change. It can be interpreted as that the 
current economy more relies on human capital instead of the general labor.  
     Long term OLS estimation on 25-year growth confirms the negative impact of racial 
segregation in 1980 on the income growth from 1980 to 2005. Although income segregation and 
central city and suburban income disparity are not significant in the model, it does not mean they 
do not affect the long-term growth. It is possible that because the urban communities are 
integrated by income, and central cities are still the urban cores dominating urban growth, their 
                                                                                                                                           
 
108
negative impact has not shown up yet. The negative sign on income segregation in the 1990s and 
2000s support this explanation.   
     Results from the analyses convey valuable ideas and insights about the connections between 
metropolitan socioeconomic attributes and metropolitan growth. Yet the puzzling results from the 
model based on data in 1990s create an obstacle for us to confidently argue the negative impact of 
residential segregation on both short-term and long-term income growth.  
     Since the structure of economy transformed from during the study period, it might be possible 
that the 1990s contains the structural change point(s) due to the massive progress of internet and 
high-tech industries. Thus it is desirable to conduct empirical research to identify whether there is 
(are) structural change point (s). That might help us to understand the linkage between these two 
very important urban phenomena.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
    Economists have developed theories about the impact of income inequality on economic 
growth, yet they have not integrated unequal income distributions across space into their equality. 
Sociologists well documented the destructive impact of residential segregation on employment 
opportunities, access to public services and other aspects of life of poor minorities. Yet they have 
not examined its impact on the entire population, both the poor and non-poor. Economic 
geographers have provided theories and empirical evidence about the negative impact of central 
city and suburban income disparities on economic growth, yet they have not studied the 
connection between segregation at the neighborhood level and economic growth. 
     Integrating studies from these disciplines together, this study developed three hypotheses. 
First, residential segregation by race and by income has a negative impact on metropolitan 
economic growth. Second, metropolitan areas with higher income disparity between central cities 
and suburbs are associated with slower economic growth. Third, metropolitan areas with higher 
governmental fragmentation grow slower.  
     The first hypothesis was developed based on the combination of the complementary effect 
perspective between high-skill labor and low-skill labor and the spatial mismatch hypothesis. 
With low-skill labor and high-skill labor segregated into distinct communities, it is hard for the 
low-skill labor concentrated in high poverty communities to access job opportunities. It will lead 
to negative returns of education investment for the poor and reduce the supply of the low-skill 
labor. Since these two types of labor are complementary inputs for production, reduction in low-
skill labor decreases the demand for high-skill labor. Then, the education investments in the 
whole society decrease and ultimately macroeconomic growth slows down. 
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     Agglomeration effects and spatial spillover effects are the theoretical foundation for the 
second hypothesis for the natural linkage between central cities and suburbs and the inevitable 
deteriorating effect of the distressed central city on the economic performance of a metropolitan 
area. The third hypothesis was developed based on the debate between the public choice 
perspective on government fragmentation and the regionalism.  
     Generally results from the analyses support the hypotheses. Racial segregation impacts both 
10-year economic growth and the long-term economic growth from 1980 to 2005. The negative 
impact of income segregation emerged in 1990s with its rising level and it is robust and 
significant in the first five years of 21st century. The negative impact of central city and suburban 
income disparity did not show up in the model until data in 2000 were used. The variable testing 
spatial mismatch hypothesis follows the hypothesized direction in 2000, which supports the 
theory this study proposed to connect residential segregation and income growth. The results 
from the model testing the impact of income disparity between central cities and suburbs shows 
that these two metropolitan components might be tied together through the labor market rather 
than through agglomeration effects. The positive effect of regional-wide special districts and 
negative effect of government fragmentation are demonstrated by the results. And quite a 
surprise, liberal annexation policies have no effect on short term growth, but they show a negative 
impact on long term economic growth. The results provide empirical evidence for the shrinking 
trend of Municipal Determination policies but create a puzzle to explain the substantial expansion 
of Popular Determination annexation policies.   
5.1 Future Research and Policy Implications 
 
 
     The fact that the model does not fit the 1990s data well and the puzzling results from it 
provide room to improve the analysis. It might be possible that massive technological progress 
created structural change during the 1990s, which makes the model unable to explain urban 
growth. Thus analysis needs to be conducted to examine weather a structural break point existed 
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in the 1990s. Another possibility is that the income data quality of 1990 might be affected by the 
high-tech and internet bubbles and bubbles in the real estate market. Testing whether bubbles 
existed at that time and then tease them out will be definitely worth investigating to improve this 
project. In addition, 15 PMSAs were excluded in the analysis because of overlapped county 
boundary issues. Thus the results can only be generalized to the remaining 318 MAs.  
     Controlling for the availability of public transit, and interaction items between public transit 
and the Northeast region might be a good way to strengthen the causal relationship between 
spatial income inequality and economic growth. In addition, panel data analysis including data 
from the 1970s will provide more information and solidify causal relationships. If results from the 
model based on data in 1970s and panel data analysis based on data from four decades are 
consistent with the results we get from the analysis in this project, we will have much more 
confidence in the conclusions we draw. Thirdly, plugging in the average values of the spatial 
income inequality variables in the extreme cases (or outliers) is a valuable way to estimate the 
effect of independent variables for a particular case. It will also be helpful to evaluate the relative 
contributions of the spatial income inequality variables to economic growth. Fourth, this project 
does not incorporate spatial statistics in the analyses. Thus checking the possible autocorrelation 
between adjacent MAs can improve the precision of the estimation. If autocorrelation does exist, 
spatially lagged regression can be applied instead of simple OLS estimation.  
     Urban government structure and policies are one important component of spatial income 
inequality. Yet this project missed some important literature to discuss, such as Elinor Ostrom, 
Roger Parks, and Gordon Whitaker starting in mide-1970s.  This literature is for decentralization 
and efficiency. Incorporating them in this project will enhance our understanding on this issue. 
     Although more research is needed for rigorous conclusions, this project has implications for 
public policy. Since the early 1990s, federal housing policies have been ambitious to improve the 
quality of public housing, to increase the housing choices for the poor, and to provide 
opportunities to access jobs and other public services (e.g. HOPE VI issued in 1992, Moving to 
                                                                                                                                           
 
112
Work (MTW) authorized in 1996 as part of the welfare reform and Moving to Opportunities 
(MTO) demonstrated in five cities in 1995). These policies were found to have substantially 
improved the living conditions of the poor and helped them live in lower poverty communities, 
although these policies confronted the underfunding problem. Yet no adequate evidence shows 
that the latter two policies are effective in helping the poor to access jobs and opportunities. In 
other words, moving to better communities does not help the assisted families share the benefits 
of the social network in the communities. At first glance, the interpretation might be that housing 
policy alone is not enough; comprehensive policies are needed to convert physical existence in 
better communities into social capital.  
     However, results from this study indicate that residential segregation is the origin rooted in 
urban problems. These policies attempt to solve the problems by mediating the mechanism, 
instead of eliminating the root. A basket of strategies including strongly anti-discrimination social 
policies and financial policies, education policies providing opportunities for poor children, and 
housing and planning policies encouraging mix-race and mix-income communities need to be 
considered simultaneously. Politically it might be hard and it is a long journey to walk. Yet it 
should be encouraged to initiate the first step instead of continually investing public resources in 
ineffective ways. 
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